The Investment Process Used By Private Equity Firms: Does The Affect Heuristic Impact Decision-Making? by Sinyard, David B
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Business Administration Dissertations Programs in Business Administration
Spring 5-11-2013
The Investment Process Used By Private Equity
Firms: Does The Affect Heuristic Impact Decision-
Making?
David B. Sinyard
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/bus_admin_diss
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Programs in Business Administration at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Business Administration Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sinyard, David B., "The Investment Process Used By Private Equity Firms: Does The Affect Heuristic Impact Decision-Making?."
Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2013.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/bus_admin_diss/25
   
PERMISSION TO BORROW 
 
 
 
In presenting this dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree 
from Georgia State University, I agree that the Library of the University shall make it available 
for inspection and circulation in accordance with its regulations governing materials of this type.  
I agree that permission to quote from, to copy from, or publish this dissertation may be granted 
by the author or, in his/her absence, the professor under whose direction it was written or, in his 
absence, by the Dean of the Robinson College of Business.  Such quoting, copying, or publishing 
must be solely for the scholarly purposes and does not involve potential financial gain.  It is 
understood that any copying from or publication of this dissertation which involves potential 
gain will not be allowed without written permission of the author. 
 
 
 
David Blair Sinyard 
  
   
      
 
NOTICE TO BORROWERS 
 
 
 
All dissertations deposited in the Georgia State University Library must be used only in 
accordance with the stipulations prescribed by the author in the preceding statement. 
 
The author of this dissertation is: 
 
David Blair Sinyard 
5605 Glenridge Dr., NE., Ste 670 
Atlanta, GA 30342 
 
The director of this dissertation is: 
 
Dr. Karen Diane Loch 
International Business 
Robinson College of Business 
Georgia State University 
Atlanta, GA 30303 
 
 
 
 
 
   
THE INVESTMENT PROCESS USED BY PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS: DOES THE AFFECT 
HEURISTIC IMPACT DECISION-MAKING? 
 
BY 
 
David Blair Sinyard 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 
 
Of 
 
Executive Doctorate in Business 
 
In the Robinson College of Business 
 
Of 
 
Georgia State University 
 
 
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
ROBINSON COLLEGE OF BUSINESS 
2013 
   
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
David Blair Sinyard 
2013 
  
   
      
 
 
ACCEPTANCE 
 
This dissertation was prepared under the direction of the David Blair Sinyard Dissertation 
Committee.  It has been approved and accepted by all members of that committee, and it has 
been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Executive Doctorate in 
Business in the J. Mack Robinson College of Business of Georgia State University. 
 
 
 H. Fenwick Huss, Dean 
 
 
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE 
 
Dr. Karen Diane Loch (Chair) 
Dr. David Robert Beard 
Dr. Steven Scott Dionne 
Dr. Pam Scholder Ellen 
 
   
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION         1  
I.I RESEARCH DOMAIN         1 
I.II RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE        2 
I.III RESEARCH APPROACH        5 
CHAPTER II:  LITERATURE REVIEW        6 
 
 II.I PRIVATE EQUITY GROUPS        6 
 II.II FAMILY OWNED BUSINESSES AND PRIVATE EQUITY    8 
 II.III INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING       11 
II.IV STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING – CORPORATE AND  
ENTREPRENEURIAL        12 
II.V INVESTOR DECISION-MAKING AND HEURISTICS – THE ROLE OF                
BIAS IN BEHAVIOR        14 
CHAPTER III:  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND      20 
 
 III.I BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY      20 
 III.II BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS       23 
 III.III THE AFFECT HEURISTIC       25 
 III.IV LEARNING AND EXPERIENCE      29 
 III.V HUMAN CAPITAL AND INVESTMENT DECISION-MAKING  31 
 III.VI A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK      33 
CHAPTER IV:  METHODOLOGY        35 
 
 IV.I RESEARCH DESIGN        35 
 IV.II DATA COLLECTION        38 
 IV.III DATA ANALYSIS        40 
CHAPTER V:  RESULTS         43 
 
V.I DATA DESCRIPTION        43 
  V.I.i BACKGROUND OF THE PRIVATE EQUITY GROUPS  43 
  V.I.ii TEASER REVIEW       44 
V.II DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES – DELIBERATION HEURISTICS  48 
V.III ROLE OF MANAGEMENT – SELECTION HEURISTICS    52 
V.IV AFFECT HEURISTIC        55 
V.V ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING      59 
V.VI HUMAN CAPITAL        60 
CHAPTER VI:  DISCUSSION         63 
 
 
 
 
   
vi 
 
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION        68 
 
VII.I  CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY      68 
VII.II  CONTRIBUTIONS TO PRACTICE      69 
VII.III  LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH     70 
REFERENCES           72 
 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A:  INTERVIEW PROTOCOL (PRIVATE EQUITY                   
     DECISION-MAKER)        72 
        APPENDIX B:  TEASERS OF THE FOUR COMPANIES    75 
        APPENDIX C:  CODING SCHEME      82 
                     APPENDIX D:  BACKGROUND OF PRIVATE EQUITY GROUPS  84 
        APPENDIX E:  RESULTS OF TEASER REVIEWS    86 
BIBLIOGRAPHY         88 
VITA           96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Summary of Teasers         39  
Table 2: Grid of Respondents’ Answers       41  
Table 3: Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance      41  
Table 4: SPSS Analytics Results        42  
Table 5: Respondents Primary Reason to Proceed or Decline Teaser A   46 
Table 6: Respondents Primary Reason to Proceed or Decline Teaser B   47 
Table 7: Respondents Primary Reason to Proceed or Decline Teaser C    47  
Table 8: Respondents Primary Reason to Proceed or Decline Teaser D   48  
Table 9: Respondents Decisions Regarding the Four Teasers     48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: The Affect Heuristic Conceptual Framework     33 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
ix 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Investment Process Used by Private Equity Firms: Does the Affect Heuristic Impact 
Decision-Making? 
 
BY 
David Blair Sinyard 
 
June 2013 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Karen Diane Loch 
Major Academic Unit: International Business 
 
Individuals utilize heuristics in order to simplify problems, which may lead to biases in decision-
making.   The research question of this study is:  “How does the affect heuristic impact the 
investment process of private equity decision-makers reviewing proposals?”   Through an 
exploratory multi-case analysis, insight is provided into complex private equity decisions by 
studying biases in the investment process.  This is a study of private equity groups’ (PEG) 
decision-making process when they consider businesses for investment.  Qualitative data was 
generated from semi-structured interviews with twenty private equity decision-makers.   The 
deliberative heuristics applied in the teaser review are learned from process experience and guide 
the deliberation on whether to proceed.  Simplifying heuristics are applied in the more informal 
review process.  Organizational learning was exhibited as the PEGs have modified their 
investment structures based on previous experiences.  The study indicates that experience and 
learning lead to the construction of an affect heuristic that subsequently impacts investments.  It 
also confirms the need for strategic decision-makers to recognize their own biases and adjust 
their processes accordingly.  
A significant practical implication of this study is the insight provided into the views of the PEG 
decision-makers as they anticipate the need to supplement the management team is helpful to 
business owners and their advisors.  The study highlights the opportunities for biases in PEG 
decision-making processes.  Accessing decision-makers at larger PEGs and approaching more 
middle market firms would broaden the results.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
I.I Research Domain 
 
Most of the researcher’s business career has been “deal-making” where he has been both 
an originator and a decision-maker.  Gaining insight into how investment decisions are made is 
very important to his clients and to him personally.  From a practical perspective, how does one 
determine whether my deal will be approved by the investment committee?  Investors are 
interested in ensuring that their investment processes are effective, that good investments are not 
rejected, and that substandard deals are not pursued.  Much of the academic literature regarding 
investment decision-making focuses on biases and recent work emphasizes how to reduce their 
impact.  Decision-makers’ biases are pervasive in industries and organizations.  Where there is 
bias and it is unacknowledged, the results can be very costly. 
The researcher has a professional interest in the question of how the affect heuristic 
impacts the investment process of private equity decision-makers reviewing investment 
proposals.  He is an investment banker who has represented business owners in transactions with 
Private Equity Groups (PEGs).  During a recent conversation with a principal at a PEG, this 
individual provided almost visceral feedback of his views of investing in family owned 
businesses.  This background sparked an interest in the issue of decision-making by PEGs from 
both a professional and academic perspective, with a particular interest in family owned 
businesses as they represent an important investment opportunity for private equity firms. 
Business owners face three alternatives as they approach retirement: pass on both the 
management and ownership of the business to the next generation, pass on the shares but bring in 
professional managers, or sell the business (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012).  The PwC survey 
data indicated that 41% of the respondents intended to convey their stock and management of the 
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business to their children.  More than half of these respondents were unsure whether the next 
generation had the requisite skills for this to successfully occur.  Twenty-five percent planned to 
bring in professional managers due to the perceived lack of skill of the next generation.  Twelve 
percent were undecided and the remaining 17% planned to sell the business.  With results such 
as these, it is no surprise that succession planning in family firms has received significant 
attention from family business scholars and practitioners (Sharma et al., 1996). 
Historically the focus of examination has been intergenerational succession.  Much of the 
research has centered on factors that prevent intra-family succession (De Massis et al., 2008).  
Non-family transition opportunities have been the topic of some investigation (Howorth et al., 
2004).  Their work explored management buyouts (MBOs) and management buy-ins (MBIs) as 
an alternative solution to the family firm ownership succession issue.   These MBOs and MBIs 
represent an important succession opportunity for family firms.  MBOs and MBIs also provide 
an important deal source for private equity.  Not only can private equity investors enable the 
resolution of succession problems, their involvement can lead to improved operating efficiencies 
in the firm (Scholes et al., 2009).  Private equity is typically an asset class that consists of equity 
investments in non-publically traded companies.  Private equity provides capital in exchange for 
an equity stake in a potentially high growth company.  Much of the academic work has been 
focused on private equity buy-outs involving public companies, particularly focused on 
governance and returns realized by these transactions (Cumming et al., 2007).    
I.II Research Perspective 
In order to process the significant amount of information available, individuals utilize 
cognitive heuristics in order to simplify the problem (Janis, 1989).  While useful, these heuristics 
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may lead to biases in decision-making.  Of particular interest is the impact on decision-making 
by investors.  The decision-making criteria of venture capitalists have been researched from the 
perspective of various constructs including management, unique opportunity, and appropriate 
return (Hisrich & Jankowicz, 1990; Riquelme & Rickards, 1992; Gupta, & Sapienza, 1992).   
Research has shown that equity investors behave in a rational manner in the way they screen 
potential deals, evaluate those deals through due diligence, negotiate the terms of the investment 
and close their transactions (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984).  Strategic variables relating to firm targets 
and the industry within which they compete are also evaluated (Sandberg & Hofer, 1987).  The 
use of cognitive heuristics, or mental shortcuts, in the decision-making of venture capitalists has 
been reviewed and can lead to biases (Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 
2002; Shepherd et al., 2003; Franke et al., 2006).   
Research into decision-making criteria and biases on the part of private equity investment 
regarding family firms has received little attention to date.  Recently several papers have focused 
on biases in the decision-making criteria of private equity investors as they review family 
business opportunities (Dawson, 2006; Dawson, 2011).  The affect heuristic has been studied in 
the context of judgment and decision-making (Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2007).  Affect 
is “the specific quality of ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ (i) experienced as a feeling state (with or 
without consciousness) and (ii) demarcating a positive or negative quality of a stimulus” (Slovic 
et al., 2007).  The experiential element of the response differentiates it from descriptive decision-
making research that has focused on cognitive strategies (Finucane et al., 2000).  While analysis 
is important in certain decision-making, individuals rely on affect and emotion as an efficient 
way to make decisions in circumstances of complexity.  Dawson’s research did not extend to this 
heuristic (Dawson, 2006; Dawson 2011). 
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This issue of biases in decision-making has also found its way into the practitioner’s 
world as several meaningful articles and research findings have been published (Hammond et al., 
2006; Lovallo & Sibony, 2010; Kahneman, et al., 2011).   While there is a clear acknowledgment 
that cognitive biases do exist and impact strategic decision-making such as investment decisions, 
the methods to minimize their impact are currently being explored (Kahneman et al., 2011).  
Practicing behavioral strategy – by incorporating psychology into the decision-making process – 
is believed to result in superior outcomes (Lovallo & Sibony, 2010).  Indeed, the research 
indicates that improving the decision-making process results in a 5.3 percentage point increase in 
the return on investment (ROI) of those decisions.  The better the process followed, the better the 
decision made (Lovallo & Sibony, 2010).  Indeed, “contextual architectures that promote sound 
judgment can enhance firm performance” (Powell et al., 2011, p.1370).   These findings support 
further study of the psychological architecture of private equity decision-making such as the 
affect heuristic and its possible impact on executive judgment. 
Executive officers and board members rely on reports and analysis from teams regarding 
strategic decisions including mergers and acquisitions, the launch of a new product line, and 
major capital investments. Inevitably, biases will affect the team that is making the 
recommendation (Kahneman et al., 2011).  The quality of the decisions ultimately made can be 
improved by focusing on the process that underlies the recommendations.  The extent to which 
defects in thinking are vetted directly through the process positively impacts the value of the 
final decision.  Cognitive biases in the decision-making process may result in rejecting a good 
investment opportunity or pursuing a substandard deal.   
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I.III Research Approach 
The research question of this study focuses on the use of heuristics by private equity 
groups’ decision-making as they assess potential investments.  Specifically, how does the affect 
heuristic impact the investment process of private equity decision-makers reviewing proposals?  
The basic premise is that private equity decision-makers who have personal business experience, 
or have learned experience from either working for, or investing in, a business, would be 
influenced by this and be better equipped to evaluate these opportunities.  Do these decision-
makers use an affect heuristic, shaped by prior experience, to make investment decisions? 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
II.I Private Equity Groups 
 
Private equity is typically an asset class that consists of equity investments in non-
publically traded companies.  Capital is provided in exchange for an equity stake in a potentially 
high growth company.  Investing entities are typically either a private equity firm, where 
majority control of an existing or mature firm is acquired, or a venture capital firm, which 
provides financing to early stage, high potential, high risk companies to allow them to grow 
(Kaplan & Stromberg, 2009).  Capital for these entities is raised from pension funds, insurance 
companies, banks and other financial organizations (Mason & Harrison, 1999) who invest as 
limited partners in funds sponsored by general partners.  These investment vehicles take on a 
variety of forms, including captive investment companies, independent limited partnerships and 
publically traded companies.  The general partner then invests capital in various types and stages 
of businesses depending on the stated investment criteria of the fund.  These funds provide a 
mechanism whereby the firm owners have a liquidity event and at the same time ensure the 
continued existence of the company.   
There is a major difference between the type of investments that venture capital pursues 
and those that private equity seeks.  The former are typically start-up or early stage. The 
leveraged buyout investment firms refer to themselves (and are generally referred to) as private 
equity funds, commonly known as PEGs.  Private equity invests in ongoing, proven businesses 
that they can add value through management expertise and capital investment.  They invest 
anticipating a five to seven year holding period, after which an exit is expected.  In these 
transactions, the PEG generally buys majority control of an existing or mature firm (Kaplan & 
Stromberg, 2009).  Private equity firms then apply three sets of changes to the firms in which 
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they invest – financial, governance and operational engineering.  These changes are intended to 
improve the performance of the company (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2009). The deals are generally 
highly leveraged, the private equity investors take board positions (usually a majority), and they 
do not hesitate to replace poorly performing management.  Their goal is to create economic 
value.  In assessing potential investments, PEGs will review the attractiveness of the industry, 
determine the growth opportunities, consider what they add as value to the business, and decide 
whether there is an opportunity for an acceptable risk-adjusted rate of return.   
The literature regarding private equity and leveraged buyouts has largely been focused on 
financial returns to investors and shareholders (Cumming et al., 2007).  Productivity often 
increases with entrepreneurial effort by management that is provided operational support and 
financial incentives to do so by owners such as private equity.  As Cuny et al. (2007) point out, 
value enhancements in private equity buyouts is largely attributable to improved operations. In 
that study the authors focused on the process of evaluating a potential turnaround of an 
underperforming business unit.    
Often PEGs utilize a structured and disciplined process when they evaluate investment 
opportunities.  The process involves the following steps: (1) review of business plan; (2) 
management meeting; (3) preliminary due diligence; (4) term sheet; (5) detailed due diligence; 
(6) investment decision; and (7) legal documentation, closing and funding (Kotak Private Equity 
Fund, 2012).  At any point in the process, the PEG may decide not to proceed with the 
investment. 
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II.II Family Owned Businesses and Private Equity 
Leadership transitions within family firms have received much attention, although much 
of the focus has been on intergenerational progression (Sharma et al., 1996).   Dreux (1990) 
conducted a general review of financial options available to family firms in addition to selling 
out or going public.  These strategies could include recapitalizations, private equity, joint 
ventures, ESOPs, IPOs or spin-offs, and holding company reorganizations. Each option may 
have an effect on succession issues of family firms.  Only a few existing investigations into 
private equity and family firms focus on investments associated with ownership change 
(Tappeiner et al., 2012).    
A number of definitions exist regarding what constitutes a family business.  The extent to 
which ownership and management are concentrated in a family unit, coupled with a desire to 
achieve or maintain intra-organizational family-based relatedness, determines whether a business 
firm may be considered a family business (Sharma et al., 1996).  In this study, family business is 
“a business governed and/or managed with the intention to shape and pursue the vision of the 
business held by the dominant coalition controlled by members of the same family or a small 
number of families in a manner that is potentially sustainable across generations of the family or 
families” (Chua et al., 1999, p.25).  The family involvement in ownership, management and 
potential succession is not enough alone to distinguish family from non-family firms (Chua et al., 
2004).  However, dominant family ownership, combined with significant management 
involvement by family members may be enough to ensure that the vision of the firm is shaped 
and pursued by the family (Chua et al., 1999).  
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The financing of intergenerational transitions by venture capital was reviewed (Upton & 
Petty, 2000).  They determined that venture capitalists are interested in financing transitions 
through the form of debt or preferred stock combined with warrants or conversion rights.  Upton 
& Petty, (2000) reported the critical factor that influenced the investment decision was 
confidence in the successor.  In 2001 Poutziouris (2001) conducted a U.K. based study of the 
family business and venture capital relationship.  His findings confirmed that family firms were 
more dependent on internally generated funds for survival and growth than on external financing 
from investors, such as venture capital.  The issue of loss of control when venture capital is 
brought in is relevant to family business owners.  This would become more significant with a 
private equity firm obtaining a majority position as compared to the minority positions that 
venture capital generally takes. 
Several private equity studies have been undertaken examining management buyouts 
(MBO) or management buy-ins (MBI) involving family businesses.  Howorth et al. (2004) 
looked at MBOs and MBIs as alternative solutions to family business succession issues. The 
focus of their work was on the relationship between sellers and purchasers relating to 
information asymmetries. Scholes et al. (2008) extended this work empirically and highlighted 
the importance of information sharing.  Their evidence suggested that the family owner may not 
always be in the strongest position when selling the firm given the expertise of venture capitalists 
in negotiating management buyouts.  Management with greater access to information may affect 
the negotiation process because they can influence who is more likely to benefit from the price to 
be paid for the family business.  
Research has also considered the view of the family firm as it considers capital 
investment from private equity.  A recent study looks at the relationship between family 
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businesses and private equity firms from the point of view of the decision-making of owners of 
family firms (Tappeiner, et al., 2012).  The pecking order hypothesis was used to test whether 
private equity was the finance choice of last resort.  They found that managerial resources 
offered by private equity were often highly valued by the family owners.  The impact of family 
specific factors on the financing decisions of family firms showed that the specific characteristics 
of the family had to be taken into consideration (Achleitner et al., 2009).  Family firms’ attitude 
toward financing with private equity is mainly driven by perceived value addition.  The 
negatives of perceived loss of control and increased business risks were paramount in the family 
firm owners’ decisions considering private equity investment (Brettel et al., 2009).   
A study in Sweden showed that family firms that were transferred to external owners 
outperformed those that were transferred within the family (Wennberg et al., 2011).  This is 
consistent with the finding that investment by private equity firms results in improved 
performance by the firm (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2009).   Bloom et al. (2009) also found that 
private equity owned firms are significantly better managed than government, family and 
privately owned firms.  They believe that this is a result of operational improvement in 
management.   
An understanding of how entrepreneurs make decisions with a view to heuristics and 
cognitive biases provides insight into why certain types of buyouts occur (Wright et al., 2001).  
This finding may be relevant for family firms as they may provide insight into why a private 
equity firm would select a certain business for capital investment.  Currently, academic research 
has largely focused on how venture capital investment decisions are made.  With the current 
interest in anticipating and understanding the unseen traps inherent in decision-making, an 
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understanding of how private equity investors adjust for these distortions in assessing 
investments appears to be relevant.   
II.III Individual Decision-Making  
Individuals are presumed to be rational decision-makers in neo-classical economics.  A 
logical, step-by-step process is followed to arrive at the optimal solution (Miller et al., 1996).  An 
issue is identified, information is collected, alternative solutions are considered and compared to 
pre-defined criteria, potential solutions are ranked and finally an optimal choice is made.  This 
rational choice model formed the underpinning of the view of most strategic management 
scholars (Stubbart, 1989).  Thus, strategic decision-making was seen as a rational activity 
wherein a firm’s long term survival was predicated on its managers purposefully allocating 
resources. 
However, these theories did not provide much insight into how individuals make 
decisions in conditions where there is incomplete knowledge, asymmetric information, or other 
conditions of uncertainty.  The inevitable incompleteness of knowledge, difficulties with 
anticipation and the limited number of alternatives available indicate limitations to human 
rationality.  For example, individuals often do not use all the information that might be available 
to solve a problem or make a decision because of their ability to only process some of the 
information available.  Instead, people use cognitive heuristics, or mental shortcuts, that allow 
them to simplify the problem (Janis, 1989) and deal with potentially large amounts of data that 
are available to them, by focusing on a few key variables (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). These 
less conscious routines allow us to cope with complicated information. Yet, using these 
mechanisms may lead to flaws in judgment and can ultimately undermine day-to-day decision-
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making.  This area of judgment under uncertainty has become known as the heuristics and biases 
approach (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman et al., 1982).   
While useful, these heuristics can lead to errors or biases in decision-making.  Lovallo 
and Sibony (2010) focus on the subset of biases they find to be most relevant for decision-
making by executives and classify those biases into five business-oriented groupings.   Action-
oriented biases, such as overconfidence, are those that drive decision-makers to take action faster 
than they should.  Interest biases are those that arise from conflicting incentives and would 
include misaligned individual incentives.  Pattern-recognition biases, such as confirmation bias, 
cause people to recognize patterns even where there are none.  For example, an individual may 
overweight evidence that supports a favored belief.  Stability biases cause inertia.  An example 
would be status quo bias.  Social biases, such as groupthink, arise from the preference for 
harmony over conflict.   This study explores the potential impact of the affect heuristic and its 
impact, possibly positive or negative, on PEG decision-making.  
II.IV Strategic Decision-Making – Corporate and Entrepreneurial 
A number of these cognitive simplification processes became the focus of research into 
strategic decision-making.  Schwenk (1984) addressed the potential effects of utilizing cognitive 
psychology and behavioral decision theory on strategic decision-making.  He subsequently 
proposed an integrative model of cognitions in strategic decision-making (Schwenk, 1988).  
Research on cognitive structures, processes and biases provides insights into how decisions are 
made regarding very complex matters with limited cognitive capacities.  Importantly, insights 
into the types of errors made in strategic management due to these biases are garnered.  In turn 
this provides recommendations for improved strategic management decision-making as an 
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understanding of the biases prevalent in the decision-making process may be tied to the resulting 
errors made (Schwenk, 1988).   
Biases and heuristics in strategic decision-making processes between entrepreneurs and 
managers in large corporations were studied (Busenitz & Barney, 1997). The researchers 
asserted that entrepreneurs were more likely to use heuristics than were managers in large 
corporations as the study specifically focused on the two biases of overconfidence 
(overestimating the probability of being right) and representativeness (the tendency to 
overgeneralize from a few characteristics or observations).  They found that entrepreneurs 
utilized biases and heuristics substantially more than corporate managers in decision-making 
rather than trying to obtain all the information necessary to make a decision.  In fact, the 
researchers speculated that without the use of heuristics many entrepreneurial decisions would 
never be made. The window of opportunity would be gone by the time all the necessary 
information would be available for a corporate decision-maker. 
Entrepreneurs’ susceptibility to cognitive biases was studied in an effort to determine 
why and when entrepreneurs think differently than other people (Baron, 1998).  Cognitive biases 
and risk perception have been examined from the view of how individuals decide to start 
companies (Simon et al., 2000).  However, recent empirical investigations indicate that 
entrepreneurs and managers think alike with respect to identifying opportunities and starting new 
ventures (Corbett & Neck, 2006).  This finding suggests that there is more to understand in the 
area as this appears to conflict with earlier findings.  Entrepreneurial cognition has subsequently 
become the focus of academic research (Mitchell et al., 2002; Mitchell et al. 2007). 
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II.V Investor Decision-Making and Heuristics – The Role of Bias in Behavior  
 
The relevance of cognitive biases to the area of entrepreneurship has carried over to 
venture capitalists in their review of investment options (Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001; 
Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2002; Shepherd et al., 2003; Franke et al., 2006).   Venture capital is 
financing that is provided to early stage, high potential, high risk companies to allow them to 
grow.  These investments are typically made in start-up or early stage businesses.   Basically, the 
investments are made by financiers into entrepreneurial opportunities.  The area of decision-
making became of interest to researchers due to the high degree of failure of the investments 
made and the perceived need to improve the investment process (Zacharakis & Meyer; 2000). 
The venture capitalists’ analysis is similar to that made in mergers and acquisitions.  
Issues including valuation, quality and compensation of the management team, and quantifying 
market opportunities are inherent in the decision to make the investment.  A capital investment is 
a major strategic decision that is made in situations that are complex, uncertain and involve more 
information than can be absorbed.  Thus, these decision-makers utilize cognitive simplifying 
processes to deal with the complexity and ambiguity (Duhaime & Schwenk, 1985).  Heuristics 
are therefore likely to become involved as part of the decision-making process (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  
Venture capitalists’ preferences for projects at certain stages of development were 
explored (Carter & Van Auken, 1994).   Certain venture capitalists prefer early stage 
opportunities and others pursue later stage (more mature) companies.  Venture capitalists were 
analyzed based on four potential differences that might exist among the firms (Elango et al., 
1995).  Specifically, the stage of development of the venture opportunity, the amount of 
management assistance provided by the venture capital firm, the size of the venture capital firm 
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and the geographic region where the investments are made were analyzed.  Elango et al. (1995) 
confirmed the findings that certain firms prefer certain stages of investment.  There were 
different levels of venture capital assistance post-investment, significant differences in firm size 
and geographic differences that tied to the preferred stage of investment.   
Many heuristics exhibited by venture capitalists have been explored.  For example, 
intuition, or “gut-feel” decision-making, was considered (Hisrich & Jankowicz, 1990).   Start-up 
selection for financing was probed by Riquelme & Rickards (1992) who found that entrepreneur 
experience was the critical factor to get through the first level of evaluation.  Venture capitalists 
are not homogeneous with respect to the intended market or product, so the portfolio strategy 
matters (Gupta & Sapienza, 1992).  This allows for risk distribution amongst the venture 
capitalists’ investments.   
The proposal that venture capitalists really do not understand their own decision process 
was reviewed and the post-hoc methodologies of capturing decision-making processes were 
challenged as cognitive psychology suggests that people, particularly experts, are poor at 
introspection (Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998).  Venture capitalists’ assessment policies of new 
venture survival and why certain criteria are more important than others were analyzed 
(Shepherd, 1999 a).  For example, new ventures that have lower market and industry uncertainty 
have a higher probability of survival.  In another article (Shepherd, 1999 b) venture capitalists’ 
actual decision-making policy was compared to their “espoused” decision-making procedures.  
The results showed that there were differences between the two and indicated that entrepreneurs 
would be better served if they targeted their presentations to the attributes that venture capitalists 
do use, rather than those they claim to use.    
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Venture capital backed ventures survive at a much higher rate than those backed by other 
sources, yet the failure rates remain high – nearly 20% (Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000). An 
opportunity for improvement in the venture capitalists’ investment process exists in order to 
ensure that as new proposals are screened the high potential investments are not unduly rejected 
in the screening process.  The possibility of using actuarial decision models as a means of 
improving the investment decision was reviewed.  Zacharakis & Meyer (2000) illustrate that 
actuarial models may help screen proposals because the models are consistent across different 
proposals and over time, whereas venture capital decision-makers may be biased by the 
availability of differing salient information at different times.  Actuarial decision models 
decompose a decision into component parts and recombine those cues to predict the potential 
outcome.  These models often outperform the very experts that they are meant to mimic. 
Bootstrapping models were proposed as a means to aid venture capitalists’ decisions 
(Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2002).  While venture capital backed ventures survive at a higher rate 
than others, there appears to be room for improvement in their decision-making accuracy.  These 
models were shown to have the potential to improve the venture capitalists decision-making.  
Evidence of an “availability bias” where venture capitalist decision-makers rely on how well a 
current decision fits with past successful or failed investments was found (Zacharakis & Meyer, 
2000).  Increasing experience of venture capitalists may not always lead to better results 
(Shepherd et al., 2003).  This suggests that there is a specific point at which additional 
experience may not result in a better decision.  Similarities between a venture capitalist and 
members of a venture team were shown to exist (Franke et al., 2006).  Teams that are similar to 
the venture capitalists in type of training and professional experience will be favored by the 
venture capitalist.   
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The overconfidence of venture capitalists in their decision-making was reviewed 
(Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2001).  This is the tendency to overestimate the likely occurrence of a 
set of events.  Overconfidence is something that venture capitalists do not lack.  The level of 
overconfidence depends on the amount of information, the type of information, and whether the 
venture capitalist strongly believes that the venture will succeed or fail.  Although 
overconfidence does not by itself lead to poor decisions, this bias is likely to inhibit learning and 
restrict improvement of decision-making.   The venture capitalist may not fully consider all the 
relevant information and may elect not to search for additional information with which to 
improve their decision. 
The issue of overconfidence has also been reviewed from the perspective of strategic 
decisions made by corporate executives.  Mergers and acquisitions have generated significant 
amounts of research regarding the transaction’s success or failure.   The role of the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) in a company’s merger and acquisition strategy has been the subject of 
empirical research (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), and in particular, concerning acquisitions that 
proved to be unsuccessful.  Acquisition premiums, defined “as the ratio of the ultimate price paid 
per target share divided by the price prior to takeover news” (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997, 
p.103) were reviewed from the perspective of the role of the CEO’s exaggerated self-confidence 
and the authors determined that the greater the CEO hubris and acquisition premium, the greater 
the shareholder losses.  Several indicators of CEO hubris, including the acquiring company’s 
recent success, recent media praise for the CEO, the CEO’s self-importance (inflated views of 
one’s abilities) and a composite factor of these three factors (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997) were 
shown to be highly associated with the size of the premium paid.   
18 
 
 
 
Similarly, Malmeidier and Tate (2005) examined corporate investment decisions through 
the lens of the personal characteristics of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs).  Specifically; they 
studied the investment decisions of CEOs who overestimate the future returns of their 
companies.  The analysis measured the willingness of these CEOs to divest company-specific 
risk in their personal accounts.  The authors found a positive relationship between the sensitivity 
of investment to cash flow and executive overconfidence.  In a later research study, the authors 
found that overconfident CEOs overestimate their ability to generate returns (Malmeidier & 
Tate, 2008). The result was that the CEOs’ companies respectively paid a premium for 
acquisitions and often executed mergers that destroyed shareholder value.   
The self-attribution bias has also been found to lead to overconfidence.  Billett & Qian, 
(2008) found that CEOs develop hubris through acquisition experience.  This in turn leads to 
more acquisitions.  In addition to hubris, the role of CEO dominance, the ability to impose his or 
her overconfident views, is important as well (Brown & Sarma, 2007).  The result is that the 
odds of making an acquisition, and in particular one that has a negative impact on shareholder 
value, is increased in situations where the CEO is overconfident. 
These papers have indicated that there are indeed biases in the decision-making that may 
impact the outcome of the investments.  In basic terms, the biases prevalent in the decision-
making of venture capitalists may result in errors made in the analysis of the investment targets, 
which, in turn, may result in poorer performance that may lead to significant losses or even 
write-offs.  Many of the studies examine start-up and early-stage firms that are typically funded 
by venture capital.   Venture capitalists generally do not obtain majority control.  A typical 
investment by private equity takes the form of a leveraged buyout wherein the private equity 
firm obtains majority control (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2009).   
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Dawson (2006) extended the analysis of decision-making criteria to private equity 
investors as they considered investments in family firms.  There is little research on how the 
decision-making models differ when established family businesses are evaluated.  Her research 
found that private equity investors consistently use a limited number of criteria as they evaluate 
potential investments: target firms are profitable, have professional managers and are in growing 
business segments.  Later research assessed the role of human resources and agency costs in 
private equity decision-making (Dawson, 2011).  Her findings indicate that family-specific 
criteria are taken into account by private equity investors.  Additionally, professional 
management and a reduction in the family ownership post capital investment are important 
considerations to the private equity investors.  
Private equity as a capital source may provide the finance and managerial expertise to 
help family businesses overcome the challenges associated with growth and succession.  Many 
of the existing studies examine start-up and early-stage firms which are typically funded by 
venture capital.  Private equity firms most often invest in established companies such as 
corporate divestitures through management buyouts.  As Shanker & Astrakhan (1996) point out, 
family businesses are the dominant form of established companies.  Yet, academic research into 
private equity in family firms is still in its infancy.  Also, private equity decision-making has not 
seen the same attention as venture capital from academics.  The link between documented use of 
heuristics and the potential for bias in PEG decision-making is the basis for this study. 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Several literatures provide insight into the research question: “How does the affect 
heuristic impact the investment process of private equity decision-makers?”  Behavioral 
Decision Theory sets forth the impact of cognitive limitations on decision-making and the 
resulting impact of heuristics (Slovic et al., 1977).  Behavioral economics reveal how cognitive 
biases, which are the systematic tendencies to deviate from normative behavior, result from the 
utilization of heuristics by individuals and may lead to inferior decisions (Lovallo & Sibony. 
2010).  The affect heuristic has a major role in behavioral theories and the interaction of emotion 
and cognition continues to be explored (Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2007).  Learning and 
experience, particularly from the perspective of organizational learning, is of interest as the 
decision-making processes of the PEGs are reviewed (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011).  The role 
of human capital is important as well as the skill, competence and experience of the decision-
maker impacts the outcome of the investment (Gompers et al., 2008; Zarutskie, 2010; Smith et 
al., 2011).   
III.I Behavioral Decision Theory  
The traditional theory of rational decision-making tries to incorporate actual decision-
making patterns.   According to the normative perspective, individuals are rational decision-
makers who follow a step-by-step process to arrive at an optimal solution (Miller et al., 1996).  
These decision-makers would define the problem, gather as much information as possible about 
alternative solutions, compare these solutions to their underlying preferences, and then make a 
choice that maximizes value.  
21 
 
 
 
This rational decision-making model formed the basis of much of the strategic 
management research.  The view was that strategic decision-making is intentional and rational 
(Stubbart, 1989).  Therefore, in order to ensure long term survival of the corporation, managers 
make conscious decisions in order to determine how to most effectively allocate resources 
(Stubbart, 1989).  However, research showed that individuals did not follow this ideal, but rather 
they are not completely rational in their decision-making approach (Simon, 1957).  For example, 
individuals do not always make use of available information.  Instead, individuals are cognitively 
limited information processors (Simon, 1978).  In fact, individuals lack the cognitive capacity to 
make fully informed and unbiased decisions in complex situations (Kahneman et al., 1982).  
One of the first scholars to examine the limits to human rationality was Simon (1957).  
He noted that perfect rationality needs complete knowledge and the ability to anticipate all 
possible consequences that follow a choice.  Individuals have to function with incomplete 
knowledge and only a limited understanding of the consequences of their decisions.  As 
individuals have limited skills of anticipation they must engage imagination.  Also, they can only 
assess a limited number of alternatives. 
Cognitive limitations result in limited rationality.  A main limitation is partial information 
processing capability.  As a result, individuals use mental shortcuts - cognitive heuristics - to 
allow them to simplify the problems they are addressing (Janis, 1989).   By focusing on a few 
key variables, individuals are able to deal with the large amounts of data available to them 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).   
Behavioral decision theory (BDT) is a descriptive theory of human decision-making 
(Slovic et al., 1977).  Starting with a theory of rational decision-making, it then tries to 
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understand and incorporate actual decision-making patterns of individuals.  BDT has two 
interrelated facets of analysis: normative and prescriptive.  Normative theory focuses on 
prescribing courses of action that closely resemble the values and beliefs of the decision maker.  
Descriptive decision theory aims to describe how decision-makers incorporate these values and 
beliefs into decisions (Slovic et al., 1977). 
Much research in BDT shows that individuals lack the cognitive capacity to make fully 
informed and unbiased decisions in complex situations (Kahneman et al., 1982).  In order to 
simplify judgment, people use a number of heuristic principles to reduce complexity (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  The use of simplifying heuristics to handle these situations is prone to 
systematic biases (Powell et al., 2011).  Each heuristic comes with characteristic biases that arise 
in special circumstances.  A better understanding of them will lead to better decisions (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974).  The theory has been applied many times in the social sciences, including 
strategic management (Bazerman & Moore, 2008).  
The application of BDT to strategic management is of current academic interest (Powell 
et al., 2011).  To date it has not made a significant impact on strategy theory and is only starting 
in strategy practice.  Rather than being limited to situated managers facing uncertainty, strategy 
research may better be applied to executive decision-making where the conditions faced are 
high-stakes, complex problem solving (Powell et al., 2011).  Thus, behavioral strategy becomes 
the focus of applying realistic assumptions about cognitions, emotion and social interactions.   
Existing research has been categorized into three schools of thought: Reductionist; Pluralist, and 
Contextualist.  Reductionism deals with the psychological character of economic decision-
making.  Pluralism in this context addresses the character of complex political judgments in large 
corporations.  The Contextualist paradigm considers the character of management perceptions 
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and mental frames.  The Reductionist view appears to be most relevant because it assumes that 
firms’ decisions are made by top executives, entrepreneurs and top management teams and their 
decisions are subject to cognitive biases.  This is the manner in which private equity decision-
makers function. 
III.II Behavioral Economics 
Traditional economics presumes the existence of ‘Homo Economicus’ where individuals 
are seen as self-focused value maximizers (Camerer et al., 2004).  Behavioral economics 
emerged as a reaction to this view, and reflects the impact of psychology (like cognition and 
affective states) which highlight what happens when individuals show human limitations and 
complications (Mullainathan & Thaler, 2000). Thus, the basis of behavioral economics is “the 
conviction that increasing the realism of the psychological underpinnings of economic analysis 
will improve the field of economics on its own terms” (Camerer et al., 2004, p.3).  
Behavioral decision research considers two categories: judgment and choice.  Judgment 
focuses on the processes that people use to estimate probabilities and choice focuses on the 
processes people use to select among potential actions (Camerer et al., 2004).  The heuristics and 
biases research of Tversky and Kahneman (1974), coupled with their work in the decision 
process known as Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), brought behavioral economics 
research into the mainstream (Laibson & Zeckhauser, 1998).  
The decision-making heuristics, including representativeness, availability, and anchoring, 
while useful, can lead to errors (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  Representativeness is a shortcut 
that delvers reasonable judgments with minimal cognitive effort.  It is the “degree to which an 
event or object is representative of a class of events or objects” (Laibson & Zeckhauser, 1998).  
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Additionally, this heuristic can lead to the ‘law of small numbers’ where small samples are 
thought to represent the properties of the statistical process that generates them (Camerer et al., 
2004).   Availability refers to people judging the probabilities of future events based how easy 
they are to imagine or to retrieve from memory (Camerer et al., 2004).  Anchoring is the when an 
individual roots to an initial value which leads to insufficient adjustments of subsequent 
estimates (Lovallo & Sibony, 2010). 
People make decisions based on the potential value of gains and losses rather than the 
final outcome (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  The decision process involves two phases: framing 
and evaluation.  In the first phase, outcomes of the decision are viewed through a heuristic and 
the lesser outcomes are seen as losses and the greater outcomes as gains.   Then, the decision-
maker attributes a value to the potential outcomes and then makes a choice based on what is 
perceived as having the higher utility.  Variations in the framing of the options (the gains or 
losses) by the decision-maker lead to different risk preferences (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986).   
The authors extended the theory to include cumulative decision weights for gains and losses and 
applied it to uncertain, and risky, outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
Thaler (1980) drew on Kahneman & Tversky’s work in heuristics and prospect theory 
(Tversky & Khaneman, 1974; Tversky & Kahneman, 1979) to show examples of consumers who 
are likely to deviate from the predictions of normative models.  The existence of these 
anomalies, including underweighting of opportunity costs ignoring sunk costs, led to the 
development of a descriptive theory of consumer choice (Thaler, 1980).  Thaler (1985) 
subsequently developed a new model of consumer behavior that combined cognitive psychology 
and microeconomics.  This behavioral approach has been applied to the savings and financial 
markets as well as to law (Mullainatham & Thaler, 2000; Joles et al., 1998). 
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The contribution of behavioral economics to strategy reveals cognitive biases - the 
systematic tendencies to deviate from rational calculations (Lovallo & Sibony, 2010).  The 
problem is that strategic decision-makers need to recognize their own biases.  Research has 
shown that in addition to fact gathering and insights on the part of the decision-makers (the 
analysis and judgment), the process that turns the data and judgment into a decision is critical as 
well.   In fact, “process mattered more than analysis by a factor of 6” (Lovallo & Sibony, 2010, 
p.3).  Therefore, strategic decision-making requires putting in place a process that addresses 
specific biases in order to constrain their effects.  By embedding practices in formal operating 
procedures intended to account for bias in strategic decisions, better outcomes will result. 
III.III The Affect Heuristic 
As noted, decision-makers utilize heuristics under conditions of uncertainty.  The affect 
heuristic, the reliance on feelings in making a decision, plays a major role in behavioral theories 
(Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2002; Slovic et al., 2007).  The affect heuristic is the positive 
or negative feeling associated with judging the risks or benefits of something.  Typically it refers 
to the quality of the evaluation.   As considered in the context of this research, does experience 
have an impact on decision-making by private equity decision-makers as they review 
investments?  This heuristic is connected to the action-oriented biases as discussed by Lovallo 
and Sibony (2010) because it causes individuals to take action without thoroughly thinking 
through the consequences of the act. 
In an article published in 1980, R. B. Zajonc challenged the prevailing view that affect 
was post cognitive.   In fact, he found that affect and cognition are under the control of separate 
and partially independent systems and that they influence each other in a variety of ways 
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(Zajonc, 1980).  He set out a number of considerations: (1) affective reactions are primary; (2) 
affect is basic; (3) affective reactions are inescapable; (4) affective judgments tend to be 
irrevocable; (5) affective reactions are difficult to verbalize; (6) affective reactions need not 
depend on cognition; and (7) affective reactions may become separated from content.  In 
summary ‘affective responses are effortless, inescapable, irrevocable, holistic, more difficult to 
verbalize, yet easy to communicate and to understand (p.169).  Zajonc later defended his view of 
affective primacy and independence (Zajonc, 1984). 
The interaction of emotion and cognition continues to be the subject of academic 
research.  For example, Peters et al. (2004) defined affect as “good or bad feelings toward an 
external stimulus” (p. 1350).   In the context of stigma reactions to radiation sources the authors 
developed a model of stigma susceptibility in which affective reactions and cognitive worldviews 
activate predispositions to appraise and experience events in systematic ways that result in the 
generation of negative emotions, risk perceptions and stigma responses.  Individuals can differ in 
the strength of their affective reactions which in turn suggests an important role for individual 
differences in risk perception. 
The definition of affect has been narrowed to “the specific quality of “goodness” or 
“badness” (i) experienced as a feeling state (with or without consciousness) and (ii) demarcating 
a positive or negative quality of a stimulus” (Slovic et al., 2007).  Affective responses occur 
rapidly and automatically.  Studies indicate that people seem prone to use an ‘affect heuristic’ 
which improves judgmental efficiency in assessing risks and benefits (Finucane et al., 2000).   
They found that risk and benefit are linked to perception and consequently to people’s 
judgments. 
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Evidence indicates that affect mediates, at least in part, the relationship between an 
individual’s cognitive evaluation of risk and his behavioral response to it.  This is relevant to the 
PEG decision-maker as the inherent risks of assessing a potential investment are considered.  
When there is a divergence between the cognitive and the emotional reaction, the emotional 
reaction often drives behavior.  Risk can be viewed in three different ways: (1) risk as feelings; 
(2) risk as analysis; and (3) risk as politics (Slovic et al., 2004).   Reliance on feelings is the 
affect heuristic.  While analysis is important in certain decision-making, individuals rely on 
affect and emotion as a more efficient way to make decisions in circumstances of complexity or 
uncertainty.  They consult the ‘affect pool’ (all the positive and negative markers associated with 
the images in their minds) in the process of making decisions (Slovic et al., 2005).  
Slovic et al. (2002) introduced a theoretical framework that outlined the importance of 
affect in judgments and decisions.  They described two types of thinking.  The experiential mode 
is intuitive, automatic and is based on images to which positive and negative affective feelings 
have been attached.  The other type of thinking is analytic, deliberative and reason based.  The 
‘affect heuristic’ occurs when people use their affective feelings when making decisions.  A later 
study (Slovic et al., 2007) continued to develop this theoretical framework.  After a review of the 
development of the academic research regarding the affect heuristic, the authors went on to 
discuss some of the practical implications as it affects daily life.  This heuristic works well when 
experience enables a person to anticipate how much they will like or dislike the consequences of 
a decision.  It does not work well when the consequences are much different than anticipated. 
The dual-process theory of thinking, experiential and analytic, continues to be researched 
(see Slovic & Peters, 2006).  In 2006 the Journal of Risk Research published several articles on 
the issue of affect and risk perception.  In his editorial, Sjoberg distinguished between the 
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concept of the severity of consequences and emotion (Sjoberg, 2006).  He argued that the belief 
of affect playing an important part in risk perception was due to an incorrect usage of the word 
emotion.  When affect is used to denote emotion it is of only minor importance in risk 
perception.   
In his commentary, Wardman answered Sjoberg by saying that the latter’s concerns were 
overstated and restated the view “that cognition and emotion operate as two distinct modes of 
reasoning to help guide risk judgements and decisions, and that not only does cognition influence 
emotion, but emotion in return may also influence cognition” (Wardman, 2006, p. 111).  The 
author goes on to consider the overall affective evaluation of a stimulus.   Research is interested 
in “the way in which risk responses can occur rapidly and automatically as a heuristic, the extent 
to which a person expends the mental capacity and energy evaluating a stimulus is a facet of 
whether experiential affect is the overriding mechanism for judging risk” (p.112).   
Affect also helps decision-makers attach meaning to information, which in turn, 
influences their ability to use it during judgment.  Wilson & Arvai, (2006) found that affective 
responses to a stimulus may overwhelm analytic computations that are necessary during 
decision-making.   The need to combine affective and analytic evaluations of risk information is 
necessary to ensure efficient and sound responses to risk (Finucane & Holup, 2006).   This ‘risk-
as-value’ model implies that differences in perceived risk may arise from an analytical review of 
a risk, an affective evaluation of the risk, or a combination of the two.  The valuation of risk 
information is necessary to achieve the desirable outcome. 
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III.IV Learning and Experience 
Of particular interest to this research is the arena of organizational learning and how it 
would affect the private equity groups while they review potential investments.  One approach to 
the issue was to apply four constructs, namely knowledge acquisition, information distribution, 
information interpretation, and organizational memory (Huber, 1991).  The area of knowledge 
acquisition is further subdivided into congenital learning, experiential learning, vicarious 
learning, grafting, and searching and noticing (Huber, 1991).  Inherent in this perspective is that 
organizational processes are learned from experiences (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011).   
Organizations learn by encoding inferences from history into routines that guide 
behavior.  Direct experience and the experience of others are both sources of learning (Levitt & 
March, 1988).  Organizational routines emerge from organizational experience.  These processes 
are subject to limitations as organizations attempt to balance developing new knowledge 
(exploring) with exploiting existing competencies.  The balancing of these two, and the explicit 
and implicit choices involved because they affect finite resources, is essential to organizations 
(March, 1991).  Simplification and specialization are used in an effort to balance this dynamic.  
These approaches contribute to ‘learning myopia’ due to the tendencies to overlook distant times, 
places and failures (Levinthal & March, 1993).   
Research regarding organizational learning has reviewed the influence of acquisition 
experience by a company on subsequent acquisition performance.  This has direct application to 
private equity investors because their investments are effectively acquisitions.  Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1999)   analyzed the impact of prior organizational experience on the performance 
of acquisitions.  They found that when a firm’s specific acquisition was unlike prior acquisitions, 
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acquisition experience had a negative effect on performance.  Interestingly, the best performers 
were either those firms who had no experience and therefore did not make inappropriate 
generalization errors or those who had a significant amount of experience and thus chose better.  
Acquisition experience had a positive influence when the acquisitions resembled prior targets.   
Additionally, acquisitions increase the viability of a firm’s later expansions (Vermeulen & 
Barkema, 2001).  The authors argued that acquisitions increased the firm’s knowledge base, 
helped break inertia and helped develop new knowledge. 
In a later study Haleblian et al. (2006) analyzed the effects of routines derived from 
experience, performance feedback and their interaction from the perspective of U.S. bank 
acquisitions.  They found that acquirers were more likely to acquire additional companies as they 
gained experience.  Further, performance feedback was used by the firms to adjust their behavior 
because recent acquisition performance increased the likelihood of future acquisitions.  
Recently, Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011) developed a theoretical framework suggesting 
that companies learn heuristics.  Their research addressed the question of “what do firms 
explicitly learn as they gain process experience?” (p.1438). Explicit learning is defined as “what 
firm members collectively articulate as having been learned from their experiences” (p.1438).  
They combined work from organizational knowledge, organizational routines and heuristics.  
The authors noted that routines differ from heuristics due to the fact that routines provide 
detailed responses to particular problems while heuristics provide a common structure for a 
range of similar problems.   They found that firms: (1) learn portfolios of heuristics; (2) learn 
heuristics with a common structure that relates to capturing opportunities; and (3) learn these 
opportunity-heuristics in a specific developmental order; and (4) engage in simplification cycling 
in which they add and prune heuristics (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011, p.1457-1458).  The 
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simplification cycling produces a small set of cognitive heuristics that are better remembered by 
the members of the firm.   
III.V Human Capital and Investment Decision-Making  
Inherent in the analysis of venture capitalists, private equity groups, or other investors is 
the role of human capital. The skill of the decision-makers is seen as fundamental to the potential 
success or failure of the investment.  Zarutskie (2010) examined whether the human capital of 
first-time venture capital fund management can predict fund performance.  Data were collected 
focused on the educational and work histories of venture capitalists that start a first venture 
capital fund.   The teams that had more task specific human capital defined as past experience as 
venture capitalists or as executives in start-ups, manage funds with greater fractions of portfolio 
company exits.  This exit was the measurement point of whether a fund was successful.  She 
found that industry specific human capital in strategy and management consulting also leads to 
greater fractions of exits.  Thus measures of task- and industry-specific human capital are 
stronger predictors of fund performance than are measures of general human capital. 
The issues of skill, competence and experience have been the focus of academic research.  
Gompers et al. (2008) found that venture capitalists with the most industry experience increase 
their investments when the public market signals become more favorable. The most experienced 
venture capital firms generally record the best performance.  They determined that industry-
specific human capital is important and so are network contacts in the industry. The importance 
of venture capital firm skill as a factor in fund performance was analyzed by Smith et al. (2011) 
who found that firm experience in the same industry is positively related to fund performance.  
Their research specifically looked at a firm’s prior experience in the sector on which the fund 
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was focused and found that a one-investment increase in experience is associated with a 0.042 
percentage higher IRR.   
Venture capital firms with partners who have prior business experience are more active in 
recruiting managers and directors, fundraising and interacting with portfolio companies (Bottazzi 
et al., 2008).  They showed that the strongest predictor of whether a venture capital firm adopts 
an active investment style is whether the partners have prior industry experience. This in turn led 
to the success of portfolio companies. Their study highlights the economic importance of human 
capital for financial intermediation.  This would tie to the findings of Acharya et al., (2009) who 
found that the abnormally positive performance of certain private equity funds was at least in 
part due to active ownership and governance that the general partners engaged in.  Additional 
research has shown that more experienced venture capitalists are better at monitoring and 
managing the companies that they have invested in.  Further, the more experienced the investors, 
the more likely it is that the firm will go public (Sorensen, M., 2007). 
Graham et al. (2009) investigated the “competence effect” wherein people are willing to 
bet on their own judgments when they feel skillful or knowledgeable and whether this influences 
trading frequency and home bias.  They posited that educational background and other 
demographic characteristics made some investors feel more competent than others in 
understanding financial information and opportunities available to them.   They found that the 
competence effect predicts the likelihood that a person will invest according to his own judgment 
increases with perceived knowledge of investing.  If the investor feels more skillful, they should 
be more willing to act on their judgments.  This is because of the fact that people in general are 
more willing to bet on their own judgment when they feel skillful or knowledgeable; thus, 
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investors tend to act more boldly when they perceive themselves to be competent investors.  This 
perception would appear to be an affective heuristic. 
III.VI A Theoretical Framework 
The framing of the research question is whether the PEG decision-makers use an affect 
heuristic shaped by prior experience, to make their decisions.  In summary, the behavioral, 
heuristics and learning literatures provide perspectives on the decision-making processes of 
PEGs regarding potential investments.  Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual framework explicated 
by these literatures.  
 
(Adopted from Finucane et al., 2000) 
Figure 1  
The Affect Heuristic Conceptual Framework 
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The grey box outlines the experiences considered in the study and their impact, either positive or 
negative, with the resulting perceived benefit or risk by the decision-maker.  Specifically, do 
PEG decision-makers use an affect heuristic, shaped by their experience/learning, to make this 
decision?  The areas of interest and comparison are the PEG decision-makers personal or learned 
experience and feedback on the PEG’s experience with investments. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
IV.I Research Design 
 
Qualitative research is often undertaken in situations where the topic is new and there is 
little existing research (Myers, 2009).  Moreover, when a study involves an in-depth examination 
of a topic, qualitative studies are recommended (Myers, 2009; Miles & Huberman, 1994).  A 
multiple case study was undertaken in order to address the research question, “how does the 
affect heuristic impact the investment process of private equity decision-makers?”  The use of 
multiple case studies “typically yields more robust, generalizable, and testable theory than single 
case research” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 27).   The result is a variety of empirical data 
that lends itself to contrast and comparison. 
This study addresses to what extent learning and experience influence the decision-
making process of PEGs when evaluating investment opportunities.  Of particular interest was 
family owned business because of the large number of potential transactions available to PEGs 
as business owners approach retirement.  Does this experience shape the affect heuristic and thus 
impact the decision-making of the PEG?   A sample size of 20 decision-makers was selected in 
an effort to obtain data from a population that reflected diversity in: fund experience; size; 
investor base; geographic location; targeted investments and investment size.  Appendix D in the 
Appendix illustrates the PEG decision-makers used in this study.  The table reveals the level of 
diversity across our variables of interest, such as education, private equity experience, and 
functional experience. 
Through an exploratory multi-case analysis, insight is provided into complex private 
equity decisions by studying biases in the investment process.  This type of research can be used 
to discover the “relevant features, factors or issues that might apply to other similar situations” 
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(Myers 2009, p.72).  This design allowed for replication logic so that each case can confirm (or 
not) inferences drawn from the other cases (Yin, 2009).  As Yin points out “appropriately 
developed theory also is the level at which the generalization of the case study results will occur” 
(Yin, 2009, p.38).  Case studies are then about analytic generalization “in which a previously 
developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case 
study” (Yin, 2009, p.38).  He adds that if two or more cases are shown to support the same 
theory, replication may be claimed.  As the number of cases that show replication increases, the 
greater the rigor of the study. 
As noted earlier, PEGs often utilize a structured and disciplined process when they 
evaluate investment opportunities.  In a formal process the following steps would be followed: 
(1) review of business plan; (2) management meeting; (3) preliminary due diligence; (4) term 
sheet; (5) detailed due diligence; (6) investment decision; and (7) legal documentation, closing 
and funding (Kotak Private Equity Fund, 2012).  Firms seeking private equity capital generally 
engage an investment banker who prepares a detailed investment memorandum outlining the 
business plan and opportunity that the business offers.  He then prepares a one or two page 
summary, the “teaser”, which is used to introduce the opportunity to the PEG.  This teaser is 
sent, typically by e-mail, to targeted PEGs as a precursor to providing the investment 
memorandum.  As the PEGs receive significant numbers of these teasers, certain criteria are 
applied by the business development officer to identify potential transactions that merit further 
review.  This evaluation results in the decision to continue with the review and request that the 
information memorandum be forwarded. The business development officer’s review of a teaser 
determines whether a prospective deal progresses through the gatekeeping mechanisms that 
PEGs have in place to review prospective investments.   
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This is a study of PEGs’ decision-making process when they consider businesses as 
candidates for investment.  The teaser, each describing a potential investment, is the unit of 
analysis.  What do the PEGs look for in the one or two page summary of the investment 
opportunity, known in the industry as a “teaser” that indicates to them to pursue a potential 
investment?  What characteristics of the decision-maker: experience or learning, determines 
whether a specific investment opportunity is progressed to the next step?  By examining the 
process and the use of the affect heuristic in private equity investment decisions, the researcher 
develops testable propositions on specific behavior and outcomes.    
This research is a process study from the perspective of a developmental sequence (Van 
de Ven, 2007).  The focus is on the progressions of activities or events.  The specific focus is on 
the nature and sequence of decision-making as a private equity firm reviews the first step in its 
investment process.  From the perspective of engaged scholarship (Van de Ven, 2007), this study 
falls into the grouping of informed basic research.  The researcher acts in an advisory capacity as 
he conducts the study activities.  In this type of scholarship, advice and feedback is solicited 
from various stakeholders and informants.  Insight will be gained from investment bankers who 
work on behalf of their firms seeking capital as well as the private equity decision-maker.  
Practitioners will be able to learn from this research as they will be able to assess whether certain 
PEGs are candidates to provide investment into the businesses that they represent.  The 
researcher remains in control and directs all research activity (Van de Ven, 2007). 
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IV.II Data Collection  
Qualitative data was generated from semi-structured interviews with twenty private 
equity decision-makers (see Appendix A Interview Protocol).  A database of 712 business 
development contacts associated with 637 PEGs is maintained by the researcher’s company. 
These PEGs are primarily interested in the middle market – defined as “firms with sizeable 
annual revenues, ranging from $50 million to $1 billion. As the term implies, such a 
firm is one that straddles the "middle market" between the smaller companies and the 
billion-dollar giants” (PrivCo, 2013).   These contacts including the individual’s name, e-
mail address and name of the PEG are kept in an excel spreadsheet where each is identified in a 
separate numbered line.  A random integer generator was utilized (www.randomizer.org) to 
identify potential respondents.  An initial list of 100 was created.  These individuals were 
contacted by email to request their participation in the research study and follow up e-mails were 
forwarded approximately one week later.  Eight individuals responded from this list.  A 
subsequent list of 125 was generated from the remaining 612 contacts and these individuals were 
contacted by email in the same manner as the first set.  Twelve respondents were sourced from 
this group.  Telephone interviews were arranged with the 20 who were willing to proceed.  This 
resulted in a response rate of 8.8% to the emailed invitation to participate in the survey.   
As noted, our data was generated primarily by semi-structured interviews with the PEGs.  
These telephone interviews were arranged with the respondents, lasting from 25 to 40 minutes.  
We also collected archival data on the PEGs from the websites of each private equity firm.  We 
obtained such data in order to determine background information about the respondent and the 
PEG prior to the interview.  Data such as the size of the firm, the number of investment 
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professionals, the position that the respondent held and the type of preferred investments were 
drawn from this review.   
The interviews took place in January and February 2013.  Prior to the interviews the 
respondents were provided with an electronic copy of the four teasers, identified as Teaser A, B, 
C, and D (Appendix B).  Each teaser represented an actual investment opportunity that has been 
provided to PEGs in a business context.  The teasers contain a brief summary of the business, 
including the industry, ownership, management, location, and financial summaries.  A summary 
of the teasers is presented in Table 1.  
 A B C D 
Summary of 
Business 
Manufacturer of 
Industrial 
Lighting 
Products 
Home Health 
Care 
Wholesale 
Grocery/candy/ 
Tobacco 
Distributor 
Heat Exchange 
Manufacturer 
Location Southeast US Northeast US Southeast US Not stated 
Ownership PEG owns 71%, 
Management 
owns 5% 
Others own 24% 
Family owned Family owned – 
60+ years 
Not stated 
Staff 55 full-time in 
US 
250 full-time off-
shore 
250 professionals 
paid hourly or by 
the visit 
30 full-time 41 Full-time 
employees 
Financials Revenue$22 M  
EBITDA $2.76 
M 
Revenue $5.2 M 
EBITDA $1.14 
M 
Revenue $46 M 
 
Revenue $8.1 M 
EBITDA $1.44 
M 
Reason for Sale Controlling 
investors wanted 
to realize their 
return on 
investment 
Owners wanted 
to transition to 
new challenges 
Absentee owners 
wanted to exit 
for estate 
planning 
purposes 
Ownership 
seeking financial 
partner to enable 
growth 
Table 1 
Summary of Teasers 
Each interview took between 25 and 40 minutes and was recorded with the respondent’s 
approval.  The initial questions focused on the background, in terms of size and general 
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investment criteria, of the PEG.   Subsequent questions explored the PEG’s decision-making 
process.  The teasers were then discussed with the respondent asked to review each in turn and to 
indicate whether the offering memorandum would be requested.  The reasons for proceeding or 
declining were explored.  The respondents were then asked to rank the teasers in preferential 
order of potential investment.  The PEG’s typical investment structure was discussed.  Finally, 
some demographic information about the respondent was collected.  This information related to 
experience in private equity, background in other businesses, and direct or indirect involvement 
in business by the respondent and other investment professionals at the PEG.  
IV.III Data Analysis 
Multiple-case analysis begins with synthesizing the data for each PEG into an individual 
case history (Eisenhardt, 1989).  These case histories are then utilized for two types of analysis, 
with-in case and cross-case (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011).  From the perspective of Miles and 
Huberman (1994), data analysis consists of three concurrent activities: data reduction, data 
display, and conclusion drawing and verification.   The three types of analysis and the data 
collection form an interactive, cyclical process. 
The first step of data reduction was to transcribe the interviews verbatim.  Then the 
process of selecting, coding, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data was undertaken 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994).  A coding scheme based on the interview protocol was developed 
(Appendix C).  Individual transcripts were then coded according to this scheme.  The coding 
system for this study used both descriptive and inferential codes to identify words and text at 
varying levels of complexity. Trends and themes between the interviews were tracked and 
compared.  This data was transcribed onto comparative grids to establish patterns.  The first grid 
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focused on the details of the respondents’ answers to the interview questions regarding 
experience, the role of the management team, learning, decision-making, human capital, other 
biases and the results of the teaser reviews as outlined in Table 2. 
 
Respondent’s 
Business 
Experience 
 
 
Private Equity 
Group 
Experience 
 
 
 
Role of 
Management 
Team 
 
 
 
Organizational 
Learning 
 
Investor 
Decision-
making 
Process 
 
Human 
Capital 
 
Other 
Biases 
 
Teaser 
Review 
Table 2 
Grid of Respondents’ Answers 
 
 
This review resulted in the development of a number of themes which became the basis of the 
analysis from which the propositions were developed. 
Inter-rater reliability statistics are a quality indicator of measurement reproducibility.  
Two additional raters were asked to read three interview transcripts and then score the interviews 
with the designated coding scheme.  Kendall’s coefficient of concordance was used to quantify 
the extent to which the raters agreed in their assessment.  (Gwet, 2012).   Overall the results 
indicate a very strong degree of agreement and are significant as can be seen in Table 3. 
 Interview 1 Interview 2 Interview 3 
Kendall’s W .788 0.917 0.9188 
ChiSq 106.4914 123.7896 151.5995 
df 45 45 55 
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.000 
Table 3 
Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance 
 
When the SPSS predictive analytics software is utilized to assess the distribution, the results set 
forth in Table 4 substantiate the hypothesis that the distributions of the three interview coders are 
the same. 
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Table 4  
SPSS Analytics Results 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994) outline a variety of means to display the data.  These include 
matrices and charts that are created in the process of the analysis and enables the information to 
be assembled in organized and compact formats.  Qualitative research is an iterative process.  As 
the data are being reduced and displayed, preliminary conclusions are drawn and verified.  
Patterns, regularities, and propositions from available data inevitably form the basis for 
preliminary conclusions.  In turn, these conclusions become increasing grounded and explicit 
throughout the process (Miles & Huberman, 1994).   
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RESULTS 
 
V.I Data Description 
         
v.i.i Background of the private equity groups. The demographic background of the 20 
PEGs provides a good cross section of private equity (see Appendix D).  Twelve are institutional 
limited partnerships where the principals of the PEG are general partners in the fund.  Four are 
“fundless” sponsors who invest their own money and selectively approach other capital sources 
on an as needed basis.  One is the private equity investment group of a major commercial bank.  
One is a publically traded business development company.  Another is a Small Business 
Investment Company.  The last is the private equity investment vehicle of a sovereign wealth 
fund.  
The diversity of respondents is reinforced by the varying hierarchical positions held at the 
PEGs by the individuals interviewed.   Seven hold relatively junior positions: two are Directors 
of Business Development, two are Vice Presidents, two are Senior Vice Presidents, and one is a 
Principal.  Thirteen are partnership level or equivalent, and of these seven are founders or co-
founders of their respective funds.  These partners have their own capital at risk and thus are co-
investing with the PEG’s investors in the various transactions. 
The investment criteria of PEGs set forth the targeted size of the prospective companies.  
The respondents firms indicate a range from $1 million to $20 million of EBITDA (Earnings 
Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization).  When the respondents review 
prospective investments one of the initial benchmarks applied is the EBITDA of the company.  
These financial criteria are important filters used by the PEGs to decide whether to proceed with 
the review of a potential transaction.  The range of EBITDA of the companies represented by the 
four teasers (Appendix B) was $1 - $2.5 million. 
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The deal origination process varies very little between PEGs.  Nineteen PEGs receive 
prospective investments from intermediaries representing the sellers.  These include investment 
bankers, lawyers, accountants, and in some cases the principal of the firm.   The majority of 
proposals, up to 90%, are sourced from investment bankers.   Only one PEG focuses on utilizing 
buy-side investment bankers as the means of originating investment opportunities.   
The number of deals reviewed on an annual basis by the 19 PEGs that accept inquiries 
from representatives of the seller has a wide range, from a low of 50 to a high of 3000.  There 
appears to be no pattern of consistency between either type of fund and the size of investment 
impacting the number of investments reviewed on a preliminary basis.  
The majority of PEGs typically close on 2-4 deals annually.  There is a great deal of time 
and work involved in reviewing and ultimately deciding which deals to pursue.  As the closing 
ratios are small, and the pursuit costs can be expensive, selecting the correct investments to chase 
is critical.  The process of how these proposals are reviewed quickly by the various business 
development officers provides insight into the decision-making at each of the PEGs.  
v.i.ii Teaser review. The four teasers (Appendix B) represented a variety of businesses, 
and, as previously noted, two were family owned and two had other ownership structures.  The 
respondents were asked to review each in order and asked whether, based on the information 
provided, they would request additional information, such as a Confidential Information 
Memorandum, so as to move the transaction to the next step.  The results are set forth in 
Appendix E.   
Seven (35%) of the respondents rejected proposals that indicated existing private equity 
ownership immediately.  Those that rejected the deals with existing PEG ownership would not 
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consider investing in such companies because, as one remarked “by definition, they are cashing 
out and going to the beach”. (13)1  As the founder of one PEG stated: “we have never bought any 
successful company from a private equity firm.”(5)   A Managing Director reflected on the 
PEG’s investments: “none of them are PEG-back. We’re not interested in that.”(4)  Others were 
less blunt: “we’re really not investing in anything where another private equity firm already 
owns it.”(8)  Only one respondent, a firm’s business development officer, was encouraged by the 
existing private equity ownership as he felt that the result of their involvement would be 
professionalized management. (17)   
None of the proposals was rejected because of the existing family business ownership.  
Indeed, it was never mentioned as part of the review.  This was not anticipated by the researcher.  
On the contrary, there was a stated preference for these types of businesses.  Family owned 
businesses are seen as attractive businesses to buy because of the opportunities to bring in 
management and improve the operations.  The theme of capitalizing on “a lot of low hanging 
fruit to make them better” (1) was discussed.  As a vice president stated in reference to family 
business owners: “you’ve got to believe that in most instances it hasn’t been professionally run 
or as efficiently run… (owners) don’t want to take risk so there’s probably some money left on 
the table.”(10) 
One principal stated that he believed the family business owners are less sophisticated 
than other sellers so the PEGs will get a better deal when they invest in family firms. (16)  His 
view was that if he were presented with two identical potential investments via a teaser, except 
one had PEG ownership and the other was a family owned business, he would always choose the 
                                                 
1
 The number following the quotations refers to the respondent from the PEG as set forth in Appendix D where each 
has an identifying number in the first column. 
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latter.  The issue of his views of privately held companies that were not family businesses was 
not discussed. 
As the PEG decision-makers reviewed each teaser, the major reasons for accepting or 
rejecting each proposal were stated quickly.  The respondents are used to reviewing many similar 
teasers regularly.  Three a day is not uncommon.  This leads to great familiarity with the 
presentation format and the ability to quickly search for relevant information from which to 
make the decision to proceed or not.   
Only seven of the PEG decision-makers were willing to proceed after having reviewed 
Teaser A.  The company is a manufacturer of lighting and industrial products.  The issue of 
existing PEG ownership was cited as a major reason for not proceeding by seven of the twenty 
respondents.  The issue of financial performance and the offshore operations were cited four 
times as a reason not to proceed as noted in Table 5.  Those that expressed an interest 
predominantly focused on the opportunities in the industry. 
Teaser A  - YES Teaser A - NO 
Meets financial criteria                               2       Private Equity Owned                  7 
Industry knowledge and experience           5       Financials – lost money                1 
 Offshore operations                      2 
 Location                                        1 
 Industry                                         1 
 Too small                                      1 
Total                                                             7     Total                                            13 
Table 5 
Respondents Primary Reason to Proceed or Decline Teaser A 
 
Teaser B is a business that provides home health care.  As such, it relies on Medicare and 
state reimbursement to generate revenue.  Only two respondents were interested in the business 
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either because they were in the industry or perceived an opportunity in the future.  The majority 
cited the healthcare reimbursement as the reason for not proceeding as reflected in Table 6. 
Teaser B - YES Teaser B - NO 
Industry – sees opportunity                         2                                      Government reimbursement           8 
 Industry – healthcare                      4 
 Size of business – too small           5 
 Location                                          1 
Total                                                            2             Total                                              18                     
Table 6  
Respondents Primary Reason to Proceed or Decline Teaser B 
 
Teaser C represents a wholesale grocery, tobacco, and candy distribution company. Five 
Decision-makers would have proceeded further and their reasons varied between fitting 
investment criteria and interest in the industry as set forth in Table 7.  Others declined due to the 
industry, its physical location and financial performance. 
Teaser B - YES Teaser B – NO 
Meets financial criteria                               1      Industry                                              11 
Industry                                                       3        Location                                               1 
Owners are not involved in the business    1 Shareholder dynamics                         1  
 Size – too small                                   1 
 Financials                                            1 
Total                                                            5 Total                                                   15 
Table 7 
Respondents Primary Reason to Proceed or Decline Teaser C 
 
The business represented by Teaser D is a heat exchange manufacturer. Nine of the 
respondents indicated an interest in proceeding to the next level as noted in Table 8.  Their 
reviews generally focused on industry and financial performance.  Those that declined did so 
largely due to the size and cyclicality of the business. 
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Teaser D - YES Teaser D - NO 
Industry                                                      6 Too small                                   5 
Financial Opportunity                                3        Industry                                      3 
 Financials                                   3 
Total                                                           9        Total                                          11 
Table 8  
Respondents Primary Reason to Proceed or Decline Teaser D 
 
In addition to financial performance, industry preference is a major factor in the criteria applied 
by the decision-maker.  In summary, the decision to proceed or decline based on the review of 
each teaser is reflected in Table 9.   
A B C D 
 YES NO   YES NO  YES  NO YES NO  
7 13 2 18 5 15 9   11 
  Table 9 
Respondents Decisions Regarding the Four Teasers 
 
V.II Decision-Making Processes – Deliberation Heuristics  
As noted, the PEG business development officers review a significant number of 
proposed transactions per year.  Generally they seek to cast a wide net so as to ensure that they 
review as many opportunities as possible.  The volume can easily be 700-1000 proposals 
reviewed annually.  The following are excerpts from the respondents regarding their approach 
towards the review process.  The “whole idea for our model is to source broad and close on a 
very small number of these transactions.”(7)  The business development officers “sign NDAs 
(Non-Disclosure Agreements) and take more information, simply because I’d rather make an 
informed decision than not.”(20)  The process will cull the number of proposals to 150 – 250 that 
will receive a serious review.  Generally, the PEGs look seriously at 10-15% of the proposals 
submitted and ultimately pursue 1-5%.  
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This necessitates the ability to quickly and deliberately review the teaser, applying the 
investment criteria of the firm, in order to determine whether to proceed.  The decision-maker 
would quickly review the material and provide his/her initial feedback and rationale.  This 
process only takes a few minutes.  
The procedures utilized by the various PEGs differed significantly and ranged on a 
continuum from a very formal process to an informal review practice.   Only four indicated that 
they follow a formal process.  “We have a very formal process in place.  A teaser comes in and if 
it meets criteria, a confidentiality agreement is executed, the Confidential Offering Memorandum 
(CIM) is requested.”(12)  The teasers are reviewed by specific individuals responsible for this 
function whose deliberation on the information contained determines whether to proceed.  “My 
boss has a weekly, sometimes several times a week, discussion about what we are looking 
at.”(10)  “Then we talk about it at a formal Monday meeting, and we’ll go through a regimented 
step-by-step process of peeling back the onion skin…” (3)  These PEGS have formal evaluation 
criteria.  One fund had a list of 25 criteria on a checklist that was reviewed for each submission.  
If the proposed transaction scores above 65% in the process, it’s worthy of more time” and they 
will continue with the review. (20)  Another relied on “our criteria is posted …in the limited 
partnership fund.  We only invest in companies that have these sets of criteria.” (5)   
Varying degrees of informal review processes were used by the majority of the PEGs.   
Comments range from business development officers stating “we just kind of know whether it’s 
something of interest”(17) to “I’ve been here close to eight years now and there is just not much 
controversy in our team in terms of whether something is going to fit or not.”(9)  These views 
are reflected by the partner level responses such as: “We don’t have a formal investment 
committee because we’ve been partners for so long but we will all sit together and talk about the 
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deals at one point or another and we are always updating each other throughout the entire 
process.”(14)  One respondent made the offhand comment; “to say we have a process would be 
an overstatement.”(16) 
Evaluations of specific criteria appear to exist for every deal, but the decision-makers do 
not clearly state them all.   This leads to a particular interest in the “rules of thumb”, heuristics, 
that are applied in the decision-makers’ deliberations.  “We are looking for businesses with a 
30% margin.”(20)  Another business development officer noted that they are looking for the 
same key points: “we seek companies with stable histories of earnings, year in and year out.  The 
other thing that we like is that there is someone on the inside that is capable of running it.” (9)  
He stated that these criteria have been established over history.  In their case, he felt that there 
was not much controversy because they were not making investments on growth scenarios but on 
stability of earnings.  
Another indicated,   “Whoever does the first screen checks to make sure that it fits five or 
six different criteria that are kind of big boxes that we would check, on which there is not a lot of 
flexibility; maybe little bit, but not a lot.” (8)  This is reinforced by the existence of very informal 
deal progression techniques: “if all those things continue to line up or there are no big flags, we 
will try to arrange a meeting.”(9)  Many state that they are ‘industry agnostic’ as they review 
potential investments.  Instead they are looking for a sustainable advantage in the industry or 
some other variable that will jump out at them as they review the teaser.  However, the results of 
the respondents’ reviews of Teasers B and C where the deal was rejected would suggest that 
there are at least certain industries that they will not consider. 
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The founder of one PEG stated: “our focus is really on owner situations more than 
anything else…we look to buy businesses…with management teams that are still hungry to grow 
the business.”(13)  This PEG has three partners “and for the most part we all know what we are 
looking for.”(13)  They seek investments in businesses that can control their own destiny or have 
a relevant intellectual component.  Another founder put it this way: “Do we agree that there’s a 
way to grow this company, and do we agree that there’s an opportunity here that makes sense to 
go after… This is a piece of art. It’s not a science.”(5)   A partner stated: “It’s not black and 
white but more of a guideline, so there is definitely some thinking about it.” (11)
Negative experiences affect the criteria as well. “These criteria have really been set over 
the last 10 to 12 years based off of what common criteria are or deals that everyone in the firm 
likes and even if they’re negative criteria… so if X then the deal is a pass, a clear pass.  And so 
those, those kind of negative criteria are set because either one partner has a particular issue with 
something where he has gotten burned before or we as a firm…”(13)   
Another business development officer noted; “Our founding partner got whacked in a 
mining deal so you’re not going to have any luck in a mining deal in our shop. We’ve had some 
automotive experience that did not go well.  I think any automotive deal would have a hard 
time.”(10)  These comments indicate that there are other decision-making biases involved in the 
respondents’ reviews of potential investments. 
The prior acquisitions experience of these PEGs results in the improvement of the 
performance of their process.  The PEGs use certain deliberative rules to choose particular  
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opportunities.  A partner reflecting on the firm’s investment criteria stated:  
So, that’s our business model: we look to grow our businesses by a factor of three 
to five over a four to five year period… If a business does not have an 
opportunity, we are probably not going to be interested… But we do look at the 
fundamental nature of the market, and find that the internal growth factors are 
really limited, and you would be required to do it through acquisitions: that is 
probably not going to be compelling for us. (13)    
A founder added; “we’re a firm that focuses on investing in high growth businesses … we invest 
in three areas, business services, health care and government services.  We like service 
businesses because they can grow at great rates and self-fund”. (4)   Another’s experience led 
him to believe: “We would rather go where other people are afraid to go because if you don’t 
have our type of background you are going to go broke bringing in the professionals to outsource 
that type of due diligence for you.” (18) 
These findings suggest: 
Proposition 1: Private Equity Groups utilize deliberative heuristics that guide selection 
decisions during teaser reviews. 
 
V.III Role of Management – Selection Heuristics   
A number of interesting themes emerge from the data regarding the role of management.  
The practitioner’s view is that the quality of the management team is a fundamental issue in a 
proposed transaction.  This perception is reinforced by academic research that indicates 
“Findings at both individual and aggregate levels indicate that the most important criteria 
associated with likelihood of investment are target firm profitability, industry growth and 
presence of professional managers (Dawson; 2006, p.7).   
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The PEGs show flexibility regarding the quality of the management team.  There is a 
continuum from those who see the existing management team as being very important to others 
who are far less concerned.  A managing partner noted: “the businesses must have good 
management in place.”(6)  A senior vice president stated: 
Equally important to us is that a company has a very solid management team on 
the inside of the company, somebody besides the primary business owners, who 
have been with that company for some period of time, where you can tell they 
have really been a contributor to the success of the business. (9) 
The depth of the management team was relevant to several PEGs: “the more in-depth the team, 
the better.”(4)   The relationship between the management team and the PEG is also important: 
“we are very much focused, not only on the quality of the management team but also the 
chemistry between our group and management.”(17)   A partner commented: “Building a 
partnership is where you create value and that’s the tough part and how we earn a return.” (14)  
Another commented: “The real struggle, to be honest with you, in all this stuff, is just whether 
the ownership culture is willing to embrace change.” (3)   
Other PEGs expressed less concern with the existing management: “we don’t have to 
have a deep management team.  We just need a competent management team.”(5)  As a fund 
founder noted: “we are loathe to enter into a transaction and just rely on past management to take 
us to the promised land. We don’t do that, because we have learned our lesson that if they 
haven’t done it before, they are not going to do it on our money.”(3)  
Most PEGs do not expect any business that is acquired to have a perfect management 
team.  This group generally needs to be supplemented and upgraded.  A business development 
officer mentioned that they look “to supplement and plug in gaps in management, so we don’t 
expect any business that we acquire to have a perfect management team that doesn’t need any 
supplementing.”(11)  In fact; “We will buy a business knowing full well that we need to change 
54 
 
 
 
out the management team…if you look back at every investment that we’ve ever made, we’ve 
had multiple changes in senior management.”(11) One partner stated that “in every deal that we 
have done in 10 years, there’s always been an addition to the management team.”(14)   
Other comments included “we don’t get involved in a deal unless we augment the senior 
management team.”(3)  Clearly, if the teams are not strong, the PEGs will replace them.  The 
usual function that is most focused on is finance as the incumbent typically will not have the 
qualifications and skills to handle the role.  The PEGs will put in new CFOs to upgrade the 
position, in particular, in terms of reporting.  Additionally, the PEGs anticipate the need to invest 
in information systems and putting professional processes in place.  
The data indicates that the importance of retaining the existing management team varies 
from firm to firm.  “Management is not the most important issue although they need some 
continuity.  One person, not necessarily the CEO or CFO, needs to stay.”(12)  The point about 
knowing who was going to lead after the transaction closed was reinforced by other decision-
makers.  A vice president noted the following preference: “a number of key senior management 
team members that have been around for a while and that would stay and participate during our 
ownership.”(11)   Most PEGs really desire an understanding of who is going to lead the company 
forward.  It can be the founder, an heir, someone in the organization already, or someone that 
needs to be recruited. 
The PEGs do expect the management team to have a major equity position in the 
business: “management owns what we don’t. We will subsidize management’s buy-in on the 
front end.”(13)  This position can range from as little as 5% with the majority looking at a range 
of management ownership of 20-40%. In the case of family-owned businesses, the role of the 
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family going forward is important as well: “if there is not equity rollover with the family, there is 
no deal.”(20)   
This issue of management owning equity in the business may vary from the expectations 
of the founder.  Many family businesses have not extended equity participation beyond the 
founder and his family.  Giving senior managers an equity position may be a difficult decision, 
particularly sharing financial and strategic information may prove to be an issue to many family 
businesses. 
The findings suggest: 
Proposition 2: Private Equity Groups utilize procedural heuristics that guide decisions 
on post transaction management. 
 
V.IV Affect Heuristic 
The interviews were structured so as to gain insight into the respondents’ career history, 
particularly as it related to work experience in a family business.  Additional questions were 
directed at the PEGs’ investment experience, and in particular, with family owned businesses.   
All but one of the PEGs had investment experience with family owned businesses.  The 
respondent from that firm stated that this was because that PEG only looked at rapidly growing 
companies.  None of the teasers provided in the research fit this profile.  In order to meet this 
investment criteria most of their investments were in companies between five and eight years old 
where the owners wanted to take some liquidity out of the business and at the same time position 
it for continued rapid growth.  Speaking of the PEG’s investments: “Almost all of ours are 
entrepreneurial.  I would not call them family businesses.”(4) That leaves 19 PEGs that had 
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investment experience with family owned businesses.  Of those, 13 had decision-makers with 
personal experience working in family owned businesses.   
The interview was conducted to determine first whether the respondent had personal 
experience in family owned businesses, and if so, had that involvement been positive or 
negative.  As a result, was the interviewee predisposed to either a positive or negative perception 
of family owned businesses?  Then the respondent was asked whether this experience made it 
more comfortable to assess family owned businesses.  Nine respondents had personal work 
experience with family owned businesses.  Then the respondent was asked about the 
backgrounds of the other decision-makers and the same questions regarding predisposition 
towards, and comfort in assessing, family owned businesses were asked.  Four respondents 
indicated that other decision-makers at their firms had such work backgrounds. 
Without exception the nine respondents who had personal experience stated that the 
experience had been positive.  Differences exist between the perceived influences of these 
events.  None of the respondents stated that the impact was a negative perception of a family 
business.  Most stated that it had no impact, that it made the business development officer “more 
or less insightful” (9) which included the realization of the complexities of family businesses.  A 
partner stated that he would “just take it into account” (13) and another partner said “I don’t 
know if it necessarily impacts my judgment of an investment opportunity.”(15)  It seems that 
there possibly is a lack of awareness of the impact of these experiences.   As one partner noted: 
“I’ve never thought about it. My first reaction is I don’t think so. And then I just thought about 
some specific examples… So although my initial reaction was no, it probably gives me a little 
more understanding.”(14)  Only one, a partner in a PEG who had run his family’s business, 
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stated that his positive experience predisposed him to a positive view of family businesses, and 
in particular, how he related with the owners. (19)  
The majority of the respondents concluded that this experience made them more 
comfortable with assessing family businesses.  A partner stated: “in my experience with my 
family’s business which is closely held and other business owners I know and how they think 
about their employees and it’s not always about the investment return.”(15)  This could provide 
insight into the financial statements provided in the teaser in terms of margins and overhead.    
A vice president who sat on the board of a family business noted: “Since I’ve sat in the chair, 
absolutely. I could definitely assess it and know the questions to ask and can figure out pretty 
quick if they’re getting ahead of potential pitfalls or if they’re just going to get blindsided.”(10)  
This adds to the ability to quickly review the information provided in the teaser and determine 
whether unresolved issues exist.  This also helps in the later stages of the due diligence process.  
The consensus was that experience enabled the decision-maker to feel more comfortable in 
assessing family businesses. The results were similar when other decision-makers at the PEG had 
personal experience with family businesses in their background. 
Several respondents stated that they “prefer privately owned businesses to private equity-
owned businesses or to corporate divestitures.”(11)  The insight goes further with the founder of 
one of the firms referring to private companies: “we have a huge favorable bias toward those 
types of companies.”(18)  He added that his firm had made investments in probably 100 
companies of which 80-90% were family owned.  This favoritism is due to the understanding of 
the dynamic of the interpersonal issues, the family’s name on the door, and the loyal customers 
that trade with the firm.  It leads in some cases, as reflected above, to significant commitment to 
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family owned business.  As a vice president stated that over one half of his firm’s acquisitions 
were family owned businesses: “We like to think that we know what to look for, know the signs 
of when it is working and when it’s not.”(11) 
Several PEGs stated the desire to be the first institutional capital in the business.  “We 
tend to like to come in as a control investor and be the first institutional capital.”(17)   Another 
noted: “Our sole focus is partnering with owner-managed and family-controlled businesses, so 
we’re the first institutional capital into the business.”(2)    
A major theme that emerged was that the PEGs view these investments as opportunities 
to earn better returns than other ownership sponsors.  As was noted:  
We feel like in general, it’s a less professional management team.  They have 
fewer formal systems and procedures in place, less investment in corporate 
development initiatives, organic book, organic growth, and acquisitions, so we 
feel like there is more opportunity in what we call ‘brokenly run businesses. (11) 
There is a strong view that these businesses are not efficiently run, that the owners are risk 
adverse and that the necessary capital investments have not been made:   
You've got to believe that in most instances it hasn't been professionally run or as 
efficiently run as it could be so there's probably some money left on the table.  
You sort of get fat, cash fluid, that's enough.  You don't want to take risk so 
there's probably some money left on the table.  (10)   
Another partner offered the view that “there’s a lot of low hanging fruit to make them better.” (5)  
Awareness that family business owners make decisions that may not maximize 
shareholder value provides opportunities for operational improvement.  One partner noted: 
“understanding that a family owned business has most likely been held for 20 to 30 years” (15) 
results in an understanding of how the business has been managed and the ability to implement a 
strategic plan to grow it.   The goals of these managers are different than those of PEG owned 
firms who are seeking an exit within a five to seven year period.  In order to facilitate these exits, 
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the business needs to double or triple in size during the hold period.   This view was taken further 
by the principal of one PEG to the perception of a lack of sophistication on the part of the family 
owners which allows the opportunity for a better acquisition price by the PEG. 
The findings suggest: 
Proposition 3: The Private Equity Groups utilize affect heuristics when reviewing 
business opportunities. 
V.V Organizational Learning 
The respondents noted a number of particular insights that they have been exposed to in 
the process of investing in family owned businesses.  These include nepotism, personal expenses 
being run through the business, and what was termed ‘lifestyle businesses’.  As one business 
development officer noted: “The major problem has been nepotism. This results in difficulty 
professionalizing the business.”(12)  This often results in pushback from the families.   Another 
commented: “Having been through these many, many times we just understand what is 
potentially out there.”(9)  The experience allows the decision-makers to understand what distinct 
features there are in dealing with a family business owner. 
A number of the respondents noted an evolution in how their view of deals to pursue has 
changed.  A founder noted:  
When we started in the business, it was all about growth. Then it evolved into 
services. Then it evolved into these three sectors.  Over time, we realized that 
using less debt, that was a much better strategy. We realized that really using 
strategic planning is a better strategy. We realized that not worrying about 
earnings in the first and second year is a good strategy, because we’re trying to 
build a business for four or five or six years. (4) 
Another respondent noted: “We have shifted a bit over the course of the last few years, 
where we’ll buy a less than economic controlling stake in the business, but we’re going to want 
certain features within the structure of the transaction that will allow us to, one, fire and hire top 
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leadership.”(3)  These comments underscore organizational learning as it affects investment 
structure.   
There is also evidence for learning about management and other elements of the business.   
I think we used to be cocky about being willing to buy a company from a retiring 
entrepreneur who was really retiring, thinking that the number two guy would be 
good enough, and we could augment him ourselves, or that we could recruit 
someone.  I think that it’s not as easy as we used to think it was. (1)    
A senior vice president noted that: “there are lots of things, like what family type things people 
run through their businesses, and just other elements of dealing with a private business owner. 
Having been through these many, many times we just understand what is potentially out 
there.”(9) 
The findings suggest: 
Proposition 4: Repeated investment experiences lead to learning heuristics that guide 
adjustments to the Private Equity Group’s business models and investment decisions.   
V.VI Human Capital 
Human capital may be viewed from several perspectives, including business education, 
industry experience, functional experience, and general private equity experience.  The 
respondents have extensive experience in private equity.  The median experience level is 10 
years in the industry, and 7.5 years with their firm.  The mean experience levels are 12.3 years 
and 10.2 years respectively.   
The respondents’ academic and business backgrounds were discussed as part of the 
interview and additional information was obtained via the PEGs website (see Appendix D).   All 
but two of the respondents have multiple degrees, sixteen of which are MBAs.  Four are CPAs, 
two hold law degrees, and there are two CFAs.  Prior business experience is dominated by 
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finance functions performed for other financial services firms such as investment banks.  A 
Managing Director commented on his career path:
I went into commercial banking and corporate finance and I spent about a decade 
doing that.  Then I kind of kept working my way toward more leveraged 
structures and leveraged finance groups and specialty finance companies that 
were also doing more mezz[anine] and equity co-investments and ultimately 
(employer) where we are doing solely mezz and equity type transactions. (7) 
Another respondent stated that prior to reaching the current position: “I started out in commercial 
banking doing primarily acquisition financing, then was an investment banker working primarily 
in the capital markets and to a lesser extent M&A work… I was involved in an angel fund that 
was making early stage investments.” (17)  
Several decision-makers indicated a willingness to rely on others within their firm who 
had experience in particular industries to provide insight into whether to proceed further after 
reviewing the teaser.  “If something comes in that I feel that one of my partners has more affinity 
for a particular opportunity, I’ll shoot it over to him and say what do you think?” (5)  This 
expertise may be developed through experience with portfolio companies.   As a partner noted: 
“we generally divide it up in terms of portfolio companies.” (14)   Another partner commented; 
“we have segregation where I handle five of the portfolio companies and he handles two so we’ll 
split it up that way.” (8)  Experience with the portfolio companies adds expertise and insight into 
reviewing the teasers.  Other firms have operating partners with specific industry experience who 
assist in the review of proposed investments. 
Functional experience adds value as well.  A decision-maker whose career included many 
years in public accounting noted: “I guess the other competitive advantage we have is it’s much 
harder to do the financial due diligence for a closely held business because they are typically 
unaudited.  We typically come from big four accounting firm backgrounds, we do it ourselves, 
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we don’t outsource it.” (18)  A PEG that focuses on investments in manufacturing businesses had 
been started by “partners, when I joined the firm, were all from that manufacturing company… 
We’re in the manufacturing space.” (15)  While most of the respondents’ firms were financial 
investors that relied on management to run the business, several stated that they were more 
operationally oriented.   “We have a different business model than most firms in a sense that we 
are a very focused fund, hands on, we have a complicated investment model and we are not 
desiring to be an asset manager.” (13)  This partner’s undergraduate degree was in engineering 
and his career included many years in manufacturing, engineering and product development.  
Another PEG that was started in 1985 is “very operationally focused in terms of how we invest.  
So we are much more ‘roll up your sleeves’, investing in troubled situations or smaller 
businesses that need help growing; something where we feel we’ll add some operational value.” 
(14) 
The findings suggest: 
Proposition 5: Human capital impacts the Private Equity Group’s business models and 
investment decisions.   
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DISCUSSION 
This study examined the decision-making of PEG business development officers as they 
reviewed potential investments.  A number of distinct themes emerged.  The teaser review 
highlighted the speed with which the respondents review a large number of proposals.  These 
individuals rapidly apply a series of pre-established criteria and decided whether or not to 
proceed to the next level.  These deliberative heuristics, the rules of thumb applied in the teaser 
review, are the ‘simple rules’ that are learned from process experience (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 
2011).  These rules guide their deliberation on whether to proceed with detailed due diligence 
based on the information outlined in the teaser, as well as selection on post-transaction 
management.   
The explanations offered by the respondents as they reviewed the teasers identified 
several key criteria employed in the decision to proceed with or decline the investment 
opportunity.  The importance of the industry in which the company was operating was cited as 
both a positive and a negative factor.  In some cases the respondents’ prior industry experience, 
such as in the case of the manufacturer of lighting and industrial products, was noted as a 
positive reason to proceed after reading the teaser.  For the most part, the respondents indicated 
confidence as a result of their previous experience.  However, prior industry experience may also 
be the reason not to proceed.   In the case of the home health business, the healthcare industry, 
and in particular the government reimbursement revenue model, was the major reason for 
declining to proceed beyond the review of the teaser.  In this case the healthcare industry was 
identified as one that the respondents indicated a strong desire to avoid.  This does not bode well 
for a major industry that is currently the focus of much scrutiny. 
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Several other factors were often mentioned as reasons to proceed further or not.  
Financial criteria of the PEG were mentioned as grounds to continue to the next step and were 
also cited as the reason to not go any further.  Shareholder dynamics were also noted as positive 
and negative factors in the decision to proceed.   
The continuum between formality and informality of many of the review processes of the 
PEGs was insightful.  The respondents utilize a number of simplifying heuristics as they apply 
the more informal review process.  Organizational learning was exhibited in several situations, 
particularly as the PEGs reviewed prior deals and have subsequently modified their investment 
structures.  This is also reflected in their evolution of the assessments of the acquired 
management teams.  Feedback on these issues through the acquisition process, and subsequently 
working with the acquired businesses, provides the opportunity to learn and apply the insight 
gained in ensuing investments (Haleblian et al., 2006).  This also supports the view that 
processes are a central feature of capabilities.  In the case of these PEGs, prior acquisitions 
resulted in the improvement of the performance of their process.  This explicit learning from 
process experience supports the view that these PEGs do indeed learn portfolios of heuristics 
(Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011).  These can be seen in the processes utilized by the firms as they 
review teasers and process these potential investments. 
The application of specific criteria to the review of the proposed investment represented 
by the teaser led to the development of the first proposition that PEGs utilize deliberative 
heuristics that guide selection decisions during teaser reviews.  Whether these criteria are 
specifically stated as part of the review process varies between PEGs.  However, all the PEGs 
appear to apply these heuristics as they review the teasers.  
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The role of management as perceived by the PEGs appears not to be consistent with 
general practitioner perspectives or with existing research (Dawson, 2006: Dawson 2011) .  
Current beliefs are that the quality of the management team is fundamental in a proposed 
transaction.   Dawson (2006, p. 7) found that “the most important criteria associated with 
likelihood of investment are target firm profitability, industry growth and presence of 
professional management.”  The data provided by the respondents does not completely support 
this.  While several of the PEGs stated that the existing management team was very important, 
the majority indicated that they expected to supplement management as part of the transaction.  
What appeared to matter more was that someone be identified who would remain with the firm 
post transaction.  The differing approaches of the PEGs regarding post transaction management 
led to the development of the second proposition that PEGs utilize procedural heuristics that 
guide decisions on post transaction management. 
The research question asked: “how does the affect heuristic impact the investment 
process of private equity decision-makers?”  The study indicates that experience and learning 
lead to the construction of an affect heuristic that subsequently impacts investments made by 
PEGs.  In the cases of personal experience of having worked for a family business, the 
respondents indicated that the result was a greater degree of comfort with making these kinds of 
investments.  They had a positive view of assessing these businesses and expressed more 
comfort in doing so as a result of their personal experience.  
In turn, this perception of a “good” experience with family owned businesses, either through 
having worked for one or having invested in them, appears to have improved the PEGs’ 
efficiency in assessing risks and benefits (Finucane et al., 2000).  These experiences had been 
positive overall and have resulted in a preference towards investing in family owned businesses 
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as compared to corporate divestitures or private equity sponsored deals.  In this manner, affect 
helps the PEG decision-makers attach meaning to information and to use it during judgment.  
Investors do use the affect heuristic, shaped by prior experience, to make decisions.  There is a 
link between explicit experiences and private equity investment.   
The research provided an understanding that many of the PEGs have a stated preference for 
investing in family owned businesses.  The PEGs believed that they understand what family 
owned business investments entail in terms of working with management and taking advantage 
of opportunities.  The data also provided insights that the PEGs view the family owned business 
as offering significant financial returns due to the belief that these businesses offer the 
opportunity to easily improve operations by providing capital, adding processes, or enhancing 
management.  In fact, they prefer to be the first institutional investors in these businesses.  As 
one respondent subsequently noted as he confirmed these findings:  “PEGs may prefer family 
businesses but they pay a lot more for secondary purchases of companies that are currently PEG 
owned, probably by a turn or two of EBITDA.” (17)  These experiences support the proposition 
that PEGS utilize affect heuristics when reviewing business opportunities. 
Several additional decision-making heuristics are utilized by the PEG decision-makers.  
Overconfidence may play a role as may other biases such as the ‘competence effect’ due to the 
respondents’ self-perceived investment skills (Graham et al., 2009).  Representativeness is 
visible.  Deals may be accepted or rejected because of past experiences of one member of the 
firm in that industry.  Mining deals being precluded almost by definition is relevant here.  So is 
the view expressed by so many PEGs that they would not invest in a deal that already had been 
owned by a private equity firm.  The finding that 35% of the respondents would decline a 
potential investment because of prior private equity ownership was not anticipated.  Hence, PEG 
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decisions on teaser reviews are overly representative of the group’s prior investment experiences.  
To a certain extent, the decision progresses beyond the teaser as a result of past performance.  
This may prove to be a suboptimal decision-making process. 
The PEGs exhibited organizational learning through their experiences with certain types 
of businesses.  Nepotism in family firms was highlighted as an issue.  The evolution of deal 
structure and changes in strategy further support the proposition that repeated investment 
experiences lead to learning heuristics that guide adjustments to the PEG’s business models and 
investment decisions.   
Human capital plays a significant role as well.  The respondents had extensive private 
equity experience.  Their academic backgrounds reinforced these sophisticated finance positions.  
These decision-makers either had functional familiarity or the ability to utilize individuals in the 
firm who had the experience for additional insight into whether to proceed with an opportunity.  
These insights support the proposition that human capital impacts the PEG’s business models 
and investment decisions.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
VII.I Contributions to Theory 
 
This study contributes to the literature in a number of areas.  It adds to Behavioral 
Decision Theory as it examines the role of the affect heuristic in strategic decisions.  This topic 
has not been addressed in the BDT literature.  The investment decisions of PEGs are complex 
and are made without complete information.  The results indicate that as decision-makers learn 
from experience from private equity investments, they are positively disposed to investing in 
such businesses.   
The decision to invest in a particular company certainly represents high-stakes complex 
problem solving (Powell et al., 2011).  Their paper provided a definition of behavioral strategy 
and identified several unsolved questions including whether behavioral strategy can explain 
complex executive judgments.  This study outlines actual executive judgment through decision-
making in real situations.  This study adds empirical support for the application of the affect 
heuristic to strategic decision-making. 
The results of this study also confirm the need for strategic decision-makers to recognize 
their own biases and adjust their processes accordingly.  The findings support the idea that the 
process of investment review is as important as the data that is collected (Lovallo & Sibony, 
2010).  None of the respondents appeared to recognize the biases in their decision-making 
processes which suggest that the PEGs would benefit from an understanding that biases exist and 
are part of their decision-making processes.  As Kahneman et al. (2011) point out, steps can be 
taken by adjusting review processes so that the effects of biases can be reduced.    As strategic 
decision-making requires limiting biases, these firms may benefit from refining their processes in 
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order to ensure that specific biases are addressed.  In turn, this may increase the returns realized 
by the PEGs on their investments.    
The outcomes regarding learning and experience complement the results of Bingham & 
Eisenhardt (2011).  Their work looked at processes as a central feature of capabilities and 
suggested that firms learn heuristics.  The propositions developed in this study support the view 
that firms do learn heuristics.  For example, as the PEGs complete more acquisitions the result is 
additional learning which leads to the evolution of investment structure and others parts of the 
transaction.  The teaser review reflects articulated processes used by the PEGs.  As noted by 
Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011), there is a developmental order: decision-makers move from 
“less cognitively sophisticated heuristics that address single opportunities (selection and 
procedural heuristics)” to “sophisticated heuristics (priority and temporal heuristics) that relate to 
several opportunities at once” (p.1458).  As experience accumulates, heuristics may expand in 
complexity. Such adaptation is evident in decision-making procedures as well. 
 VII.II Contributions to Practice 
A significant practical implication of this study is the insights provided into the views of 
the PEG decision-makers as they consider management teams.  Understanding that PEGs 
anticipate the need to supplement the management team, and in particular the finance function, is 
helpful to business owners and their advisors.  This reduces the need to recruit and train 
professional managers in an effort to close a transaction.  The understanding that someone has to 
stay will be of value as decisions are made on the post transaction management team. 
The view that PEGs anticipate attractive purchasing opportunities is also very useful.  
These owners will be well instructed to retain professional bankers, lawyers and other 
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consultants to ensure that their interests are well represented.  From the practitioner’s 
perspective, this would appear to be very valuable. 
From the perspective of the PEGs, the study highlights the potential existence of biases in 
their decision-making processes which may have a deleterious impact.  The almost automatic 
decision to rule out investments that have existing private equity investors may exclude excellent 
investment opportunities from being examined.  Similarly, the decision to decline a proposed 
transaction because of a negative prior experience in that industry may have the same effect.  
The PEG review processes would likely be improved by ensuring that biases are recognized and 
addressed in the way that prospective investments are reviewed. 
VII.III Limitations and Further Research 
This study has several limitations that may provide a basis for additional research.  
Limitations of the multiple case method, specifically the problem of generality and credibility, 
do exist.  The number of respondents and the issue of non-response from the PEG decision-
makers who did not respond suggest the potential for bias in the findings.  Additionally, several 
respondents confirmed the validity of the characterizations after reviewing the themes suggested 
in the study. 
As Trochim and Donnelly (2009) point out, qualitative research is often undertaken in 
order to understand a phenomenon well enough to form some initial theories or hypotheses about 
how it works.  Five propositions have been suggested based on the study.  The next step would 
be to derive hypotheses from these propositions and conduct more research via a more detailed 
instrument and a larger scale study.   In addition to the affect heuristic, a more comprehensive 
study of other biases, such as representativeness and overconfidence as identified by several 
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respondents in this study, could be undertaken.  These are the beginning steps in understanding 
the phenomenon of the decision-making process and the role of biases in the private equity 
industry.  There are significant opportunities for future research. 
The issue of transferability of these findings to other contexts would be the basis for 
additional research. Whether or not the findings hold in another context (say, large-scale PE fund 
investments) is an empirical issue.  Limiting the number of interviews to twenty rendered the 
initial research manageable.    However, this represents a small percentage of the approximately 
774 private equity firms that predominantly target mid-market companies in the United States 
and Canada (Perqin, 2013).  This is from a total of 1914 active private equity firms 
headquartered in the United States.  An opportunity for a survey of significantly more private 
equity groups and to approach a number of individual decision-makers in each of these firms 
would add significantly to the findings.   The size of the PEGs and the transactions that they 
pursue places them in the small end of the middle market.  Accessing decision-makers at larger 
PEGs would broaden the results.  An analysis of international private equity firms would extend 
the findings as well. 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL (PRIVATE EQUITY DECISION-MAKER) 
 
Atmospherics/Rapport/Context 
1) Tell me a little about the Private Equity Fund 
a. How large is the fund?  How much capital has been raised?  
b. When was the capital for the fund raised? I.e. what year did it close? Has the Fund 
funded any transactions? If so, what types of deals have they done? Are they 
looking for platform or add-on investments? 
c. Is this the first fund? 
a. How many other funds has this group sponsored? 
b. Have they been involved with other funds with different sponsors? 
d. What are the investment criteria of the PEG? 
a. Targeted size of transaction 
b. Industry focus 
c. Geographic focus 
d. Type of transaction  
1. Buy-outs 
2. Mezzanine debt 
3. Majority or minority investments 
Core Interest  
2) What is the investment decision-making process? 
a. How does a potential transaction progress through the PEG’s investment decision-
making process? 
b. Are there established criteria that the first screener has to apply?  If so, what are 
they? (examples would be deal size, industry focus, geographic focus) 
c. Who establishes them? 
 
3) I would like you to review four teasers (deal summary sheets) that represent four 
potential investments.  
a. Based on your review would you request the offering memorandum for additional 
information? 
b. Why or why not? 
a. Industry focus? 
b. Geographical location? 
c. Financial performance? 
d. Management? 
e. Similarities to deals that the fund has done before? 
f. Size of the prospective investment? 
g. Ownership? 
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4) Investment structure 
a. How would they approach valuation in each scenario? 
a. Would there be any differences between the various deals 
b. If so, on what grounds? 
b. What issues in particular would they be interested- concerned with?  
a. What would the role of management be going forward 
b. Would the fund take a control position? 
c. Would they want board representation? Board control? 
c. Any differences in the deal structure? 
a. More/less cash? 
b. Earn-out or not? 
c. Seller note? 
Demographic background 
5) Tell me a little about yourself 
a. What previous business experiences have you had? 
a. What types of businesses? What industries and where located? How large 
were they in terms of revenues? 
b. What role(s) did you have? Operational, financial, legal etc.? 
c.  Do you have experience with family owned businesses?  If so, how much? 
a. Did you have direct personal experience in your family’s business?  
1. What type of business was it? 
2. What was your role? 
3. How long were you there 
4. What was your relationship to the CEO or other senior managers? 
5. Was the firm owned by the founder?  
b. Have you worked for family business that was not owned by an immediate 
family member? 
1. If so, what type of business was it? 
2. Who owned and managed the business? 
3. What was your role? 
4. How long were you there?  
5.  Was the firm owned by the founder? 
c. Where these experiences positive or negative?  Why?  To what extent do 
you believe that your experience with a family firm predisposes you to a 
positive-negative perception of family-owned businesses? 
d. To what extent does your prior experience make you more comfortable 
assessing family owned businesses? 
d. What experience do you have in the private equity world? 
a. How many years? 
b. How many deals have you done? 
 
6) Information on other decision-makers at the private equity group 
a. Do any other executives of the fund have backgrounds in family business, either 
through their own families of having worked for another family business 
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a. What percentage (number) of the executives has family-owned business 
experience?  
b. Is this through their own family’s owned business or working for a third 
party family business?  
b. Does he/she have learned experiences from either having worked for a family 
business or having invested in a family business 
c. How many investment opportunities does your firm review per year? 
d. What percentage would be family-owned firms? 
e. Of these, what percentage of these get through the teaser review and are put 
through the full review process?  
 
7) Is there anything that you would like to ask me? 
I would like to thank you for spending so much time with me.  Your insights will prove to be 
very helpful and I appreciate your answers.  I would be happy to provide an executive summary 
of my findings if you are interested.  
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APPENDIX B: TEASERS OF THE FOUR COMPANIES 
 
Teaser A 
Manufacturer of Lighting Products & Industrial Switches 
SUMMARY: The Company manufactures industrial lighting products and switches for use in a 
variety of industries, including instrumentation, automotive and gaming. 
LOCATION: The Company is based in a large city in the Southern USA. The city is served by daily 
non-stop flights to all major US cities and many European capitals. The Company 
also operates an off-shore assembly facility in a low-cost country located in close 
proximity to the Company’s headquarter location. 
OWNERSHIP: The Company is controlled by a Private Equity Group and Management who owns 
71% and 5%, respectively, of its shares. 
FACILITIES: The Company operates out of a 27,000 sq. ft., leased facility at its headquarters. They 
also lease two buildings totaling approximately 38,000 sq. ft. at their off-shore 
location.  
PRODUCTION: The Company does injection molding, electronic assembly, surface-mount printing & 
board population at their main facility. Their off-shore facility is used for assembly 
operations as well as injection molding and wire processing. They have 17 injection 
molding machines ranging in size from 40T to 260T as well as seven robotic and 
automatic wire processing machines.  
PRODUCTS: The Company manufactures and sells a variety of products including: LCD, LED, 
and OLED lights, indicator lamps, lamp holders, and switches. The products are 
used by automotive, marine, off-road, industrial, gaming, and other OEMs. Several 
of the Company’s products are branded and proprietary. They recently launched a 
line of tamper-proof LED lights & fixtures designed for niche industries. 
SALES/ 
MARKETING: The Company has one full-time sales person and three manufacturer’s reps who call 
directly upon OEM customers. Automotive customers generate 45% of total sales. 
The Company generates approximately 15% of its total sales from its proprietary 
products.  
MANAGEMENT 
& STAFF: The Company employs approximately 55 full-time employees at its US facility and 
250 full-time employees at its off-shore facility. None of the employees are members 
of a trade union. Employees receive various Company-sponsored insurance benefits. 
All employees and the management team desire to remain after a transaction. 
Management would be interested in an equity position, if available. 
FINANCIAL: The Company had financial issues in 2007, requiring the business to be recapitalized 
with its (now) current investors/owners who invested their capital as senior & junior 
debt. In 2009, the investor group replaced management with a new team who has 
turned the Company around and returned it to operational profitability.  
76 
 
 
 
Synopsis Income Statement (000) s deleted; 31 December year end 
  Audit Audit Audit Audit Projected Projected Projected 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2012 2013 
Net Sales 17,283 18,640 14,853 22,619 19,439 24,984 28,939 
Gross Profit 852 2,437 3,026 4,098 4,745 6,241 7,850 
Gross Profit % 4.9% 13.1% 20.4% 18.1% 24.4% 25.0% 27.1% 
         
Operating Expenses 2,602 2,722 2,322 3,054 2,476 2,604 2,858 
Operating Income (1,750) (286) 704 1,044 2,269 3,637 4,991 
         
Adjusted 
E
B
I
T
D
A 
(756) 783 1,984 2,760 3,061 4,429 5,784 
EBITDA % -4.4% 4.2% 13.4% 12.2% 15.7% 17.7% 20.0% 
*Note: Projection for 2011 is “likely case scenario.” However, based on several pending orders, 2011 results potentially may be much 
stronger. 
Synopsis Balance Sheet (000) s deleted; as of 31December year end 
 Audit Audit Audit Audit 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Current Assets 3,687 3,103 4,708 7,045 
Net Fixed Assets 5,024 4,906 4,362 4,038 
Other Assets 296 283 281 347 
     
Total Assets 9,007 8,292 9,350 11,431 
     
Current Liabilities 2,900 2,508 2,260 1,834 
Long Term Liabilities 430 264 124 45 
Total Liabilities 3,330 2,772 2,384 1,879 
Shareholder's Equity 5,677 5,520 6,966 9,552 
     
Total Liabilities & 
Equity 
9,007 8,292 9,350 
11,431 
Note: Balance Sheet is shown on a cash free/debt free basis. The Seller assumes an asset sale and the delivery 
of a cash free/debt free balance sheet. 
REASON 
FOR SALE: The controlling investor group seeks to sell the Company to realize a return on its 
investment as well as to match the Company with a strategic or financial partner 
better suited to assist the Company with its growth opportunities. 
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Teaser B 
Home Health Care 
Medicare Certified/Mental Health Licensed 
Child & Family Services - Northeast 
Products/Services 
Child and Family Services Division (72% of revenue) 
The Company's licensed behavioral health professionals work with families of children diagnosed 
with mental illness, behavioral issues, developmental disabilities, and other specialized needs. 
Clinicians follow a treatment plan that is designed to develop the child in several specific areas 
including behavior management; life and social skills; motor, physical, and psychological 
development; and self-awareness. 
 
Home Care Division (28% of revenue) 
The Company is Medicare Licensed and provides skilled medical services to post acute care patients 
in their home. Patients range in age from medically complex children to the elderly. The Company 
provides registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, certified nurse’s assistants, occupational 
therapists, physical therapists, and medical social workers to assist the medical needs of acute care 
children and the elderly. Additionally, the Company provides a variety of personalized healthcare 
services to clients in the privacy of their homes.   The Company's personal support specialists assist 
the non-medical needs of acute care children and the elderly with a range of personal care services 
that do not require licensed assistance. These services may include bathing, housekeeping, picking 
up medications or groceries, and other tasks that are difficult for the patient to do themselves. All of 
the Company's services are billed on an hourly basis or by the visit and reimbursed by two state-
funded insurance programs as well as the United States Federal Government Medicare program. 
 
Organization 
The company employs non-union personnel consisting of approximately 250 employees, which 
varies according to workloads.  The Company's experienced team of health care professionals 
includes licensed clinicians, behavioral health professionals, registered nurses, licensed practical 
nurses, certified nurse's assistants, physical therapists, occupational therapists, medical social 
workers, home health aides, and personal support specialists. All of the Company’s professional staff 
are paid hourly, or by the visit. 
 
Markets/Customers 
The Company serves a statewide patient base comprised of approximately 325 children, families, 
and seniors.   The Company receives all patients by referral directly or through State healthcare 
programs. The Company excels in providing its treatment services to children and families in 
underserved communities throughout the state. 
 
Competitive Advantages 
Significant competitive advantages include: 
• State License - mental health service provider 
• Top Provider - two specific treatment services 
• Zero Deficiencies - regulatory compliance 
• Federal License - Medicare provider 
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• Statewide Professional Team - trained/certified clinicians 
• Rural Provider - serves rural communities throughout state 
 
Reason for Sale 
The owners are at a point in their lives where they want to transition into new challenges and career 
interests, and are planning an exit strategy.  The owners are willing to remain involved with the 
Company for a period of time through an employment contract or on a consulting basis. 
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Teaser C 
 
Wholesale Grocery/Candy/Tobacco Distributor-Southeastern USA 
 
SUMMARY: The Company distributes tobacco, candy and other grocery products to the 
convenience store market place within a two-state region in the Southeastern 
USA. 
HISTORY: Founded more than 60 years ago and under continuous family ownership since 
inception. The owners are absent and not involved in day-to-day management. 
LOCATION: The Company is located in a mid-size city in the Southeast situated 
approximately 45 minutes from a major metropolitan area. The Company is 
near two major Interstate highways and several US Highways. There is 
adequate low-cost labor supply to continue to grow the business. 
PRODUCTS: Tobacco products, candy and various other grocery products for the 
convenience store market. The Company also sells refrigerated and frozen 
products. 
SALES & 
MARKETING: The Company utilizes a direct sales force of five outside sales people to call on 
trade accounts within a 100 mile radius of the warehouse. The sales people are 
supported by two inside customer service representatives.  
FACILITIES: The warehouse is 65,000 sq.ft. situated on 4.5 acres permitting, allowing for 
expansion up to double its current size. It is a metal building with broad span 
and high side walls; it is leased from a related entity at a fair market rent. The 
building presently has approximately 850 sq.ft. of cooler space and 1,725 sq.ft. 
of freezer storage. The Company owns and operates 8 straight trucks each 
rated at 25,000 GVW with boxes ranging in length from 18’ to 22’. The 
warehouse and real property are owned by a related third-party and leased to 
the Company on a fair-market basis.  
FINANCIAL: Sales for FY10 (June 30) were $46 million (an increase of 9.5% from FY09) 
with EBITDA increasing by 200% from the previous year. Sales for FY11 are 
on track to be in line with or higher than the previous year. They have a very 
strong balance sheet and consistently have AR in excess of $1.0 million and 
inventory in excess of $1.0 million. Acquiring the warehouse could add 
considerable leverage. 
STAFF: The Company has approximately 30 employees, none of whom are members 
of a trade union. Most staff members have been with the Company for many 
years and have extensive industry experience. The management team will stay 
with new owners. 
REASON  
FOR SALE: The Company is owned and controlled (100%) by absent shareholders who 
seek to sell it for estate planning purposes. 
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Teaser D 
 
Heat Exchange Manufacturer 
Products/Services 
The Company is a leading designer and manufacture r of high-quality engineered heat exchangers and coolers, that 
meet the most critical of requirements.  A heat exchanger is a device used to transfer heat from a fluid (liquid or gas) 
on one side of a barrier to a fluid on the other side without bringing the fluids into direct contact.  As a Tier 1, ISO 
9001:2000 certified supplier, the Company provides products directly to global OEMs for use in recreational boats, 
commercial marine vessels, on– and off-road trucks, industrial equipment, and agricultural equipment.  The 
Company’s products range from small oil coolers for low horsepower engines to units for engines with more than 
10,000 horsepower.  Products include: 
 
 Charge air coolers  Fuel coolers  Power steering oil coolers 
 Engine oil coolers  Hydraulic oil coolers  Transmission oil coolers 
 Engine water coolers  Polymer oil coolers  Combination coolers 
 
Organization 
The Company employs all non-union personnel consisting of 41 full-time employees.  The Company’s key staff 
members have tremendous amounts of industry experience and their ability to manage daily operations of the 
Company and consistently deliver quality products in a timely manner has earned the confidence and respect of 
customers and suppliers.  Currently, the Company operates one full shift from 6:00am to 2:30pm Monday through 
Friday, and a limited second shift from 2:30pm to 7:00pm Monday through Friday. 
 
Markets/Customers 
The Company maintains a customer base of approximately 100 accounts, and its largest customer contributed 18.5% 
to 2010 revenue. Management has always placed a special emphasis on customer service, and its high level of repeat 
business (nearly 100%) speaks to the quality of its customer relationships. The Company’s superior customer 
service, uncompromising dedication to quality, and unparalleled engineering and manufacturing expertise has 
cemented their standing as the preferred supplier for several customers. The Company’s customer base is comprised 
of OEMs in the following markets: On– and Off-road Trucks (49% of revenue); Marine (40%); Industrial (5%); 
Agricultural Equipment (2%); Aftermarket parts (1%); and other (3%).   
 
Financial Notes 
Sales declined in 2007 and 2008 primarily due to downturns in the marine industry.  In late 2008, the Company took 
deliberate steps to diversify its customer base and added several customers in the on-road truck, agricultural, and 
other markets; however, in 2009, the economic recession caused customers to reduce orders, delay receipt of 
product, and cancel orders.  In 2010, revenue increased by 80% as many customers began increasing orders.  
Additionally, sales from a newly added product line bolstered growth and improved profit margins. In 2011, sales 
were up by nearly 10%. 
 
Facility 
The Company operates out of a 58,000 square foot facility on 3.2 acres.  The facility is owned separately by a 
related entity and leased to the Company.  The facility is approximately 65% utilized and there is ample room for 
expansion.  The real estate may be included as part of the sale or leased at fair market rates. 
 
Reason for Sale 
Ownership believes the Company has excellent prospects for future growth and is concerned their conservative 
nature may prevent (has prevented) the Company from realizing its full potential.   Ownership feels that growth 
would be best achieved with a financial or strategic partner, and is open to a sale, recapitalization, or partnership.  In 
any event, ownership desires to stay with the Company for the long term and is committed to helping the Company 
grow to its full potential.  
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Income Statement—FYE September 30  (C Corp) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Balance Sheet—September 30, 2011 (FYE 9/30; C Corp) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assets
Current Assets
Cash 443,372            
A/R trade 1,391,312         
Inventories 1,180,919         
Prepaid expenses 53,143              
All Other Current Assets 10,720              
Total Current Assets 3,079,466         
Net Fixed Assets 1,515,580         
Other Assets
Patents 19,733              
Less: Accum depreciation (3,909)               
Security deposit-JansCo 30,000              
Long-term investments, cost -                         
Total Other Assets 45,824              
Total Assets 4,640,870         
Liabilities and Equity
Current Liabilities
Current portion of LT Debt 55,100              
Accounts payable 740,832            
Customer deposits -                         
Loan payable - line of credit -                         
Income taxes payable -                         
Accrued expenses 260,505            
Total Current Liabilities 1,056,437         
Long Term Debt 2,026,095         
Deferred Income Taxes 133,340            
Total Equity 1,424,998         
Total Liabilities and Equity 4,640,870         
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APPENDIX C: CODING SCHEME 
 
Coding Scheme 
 
1 Private Equity Fund Background 
    1.1 Size of the Fund 
    1.2 Prior fund experience 
    1.3 Structure of Fund 
    1.4 Investment criteria 
    1.5 Type of transactions  
2 Investment Decision-Making Process 
    2.1 Formal - informal 
    2.2 Criteria 
    2.3 Responsibility for establishing criteria 
3 Deals 
   3.1 Go 
      3.1.1 Founder involvement 
      3.1.2 Industry preference 
      3.1.3 Financial performance 
      3.1.4 Management 
      3.1.5 Other ownership 
      3.1.6 Previous industry experience 
      3.1.7 Other 
   3.2 No Go 
      3.2.1 Founder involvement 
      3.2.2 Other ownership involvement 
      3.2.3 Industry preference 
      3.2.4 Financial Performance 
      3.2.5 Size 
      3.2.6 Location 
      3.2.7 Other 
   3.3 Ranking of teasers 
   3.4 Role of management 
      3.4.1 Founder 
      3.4.2 Management team retained 
      3.4.3 Bringing in new team 
   3.5 Control / Board 
4 Experience 
   4.1 Prior business experience 
   4.2 Personal experience working in family business 
       4.2.1 Positive 
       4.2.2 Negative 
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   4.3 Other’s PEG decision-maker personal experience 
w/FOB 
       4.3.1 Positive 
      4.3.2 Negative 
   4.4 PEG learned experience from investing in FOB 
5. Organizational Learning 
   5.1 Processes 
   5.2 Heuristics 
   5.3 Previous acquisition experience 
6  Deal flow 
   6.1 Number of deals received 
   6.2 Number of deals reviewed in detail 
   6.3 Number of deals closed 
   6.4 Percentage family owned 
7. Investor decision-making 
8. Other biases 
9. Human Capital 
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APPENDIX D: BACKGROUND OF PRIVATE EQUITY GROUPS 
 
# Private 
Equity 
Group Type 
Title of 
Informant 
Educational 
background 
Years at 
Fund 
Years in PE  Functional  
Experience 
Target 
Company 
Size  
EBITDA 
Deals 
Reviewed/ 
Closed   
1 Institutional 
LP Fund 
 
Managing 
Partner – 
Founder 
BBA, JD, 
CPA 
24 24 Investment 
banking 
and legal 
counsel  
 
$1 - $4 M 2,000 deals 
CIMs on 
20% 
 
2 Institutional 
LP Fund 
 
Managing 
Partner – Co-
Founder 
BA 10 15 Consulting and 
CFO 
$4 M + 250 
1 – 2 Closed 
3  Institutional 
LP Fund 
 
Managing 
Partner – 
Founder 
BA, MBA 10 24   
*14 as a 
private 
equity 
investor 
 
Financial 
services 
$2-$10 M 50-60 
3 closed 
4 Institutional 
LP Fund 
 
Managing 
Director - 
Co-Founder 
BS, MBA 32 32 Commercial 
banking 
$5 - $20 
M 
300 
CIMs on 
10% 
4 closed 
5 Institutional 
LP Fund 
 
Managing 
Partner – Co-
Founder 
BBA, MBA 6 18 Strategic 
planning and 
investment 
banking 
experience 
 
$1.5 - $6 
M 
1,000 
CIMs on 
10% 
0 closed 
6 Institutional 
LP Fund 
 
Managing 
Director 
MBA, CPA 20 20 Public 
accounting, 
entrepreneurial 
start-up 
 
$2-$5 M  Use buy side 
IBs –10-15 
deals a year 
1-2 Closed 
7 Institutional 
LP Fund 
 
Managing 
Director 
BSBA, MBA 7 7 Corporate, 
commercial 
banking, and 
other lending 
experience 
 
$5-$50 M 700-1000 
CIMs on 
15% 
5-6 Closed 
8  Institutional 
LP Fund 
 
Partner BSBA, 
MBA, CFA 
6 6 Financial 
analysis 
$2-$20 M 500-1000 
CIMs on 
10% 
3 Closed 
 
9 
 
Institutional 
LP Fund 
 
Senior Vice 
President 
MBA 8 10 Equity research 
at investment 
bank and 
consulting 
$1.5 -
$10M  
500-600 
deals 
CIMs on 15-
20% 
3-5 close 
 
10 Institutional 
LP Fund 
 
Vice 
President 
BA, MBA 7 7 Corporate 
finance 
experience 
$2-$20 M 400 
CIMs on 15-
20% 
2 Closed 
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11 Institutional 
LP Fund 
 
Vice 
President 
BS Business, 
MBA 
6 6 Corporate 
development 
positions 
$7-$25 M 780 deals 
CIMs on 
50% 
2 Closed 
 
12 Institutional 
LP Fund 
 
Director – 
Business 
Development 
B.S.  4 4 Business 
development 
and boutique 
investment 
banking 
 
$4 M +   1000 deals 
2 Closed 
13 Fundless 
Sponsor  
 
Partner – Co-
Founder 
B.S. 
Mechanical 
Engineering, 
MBA, CFA 
7  15 Operations 
experience in 
manufacturing 
and engineering 
 
$2 - $10 
M 
75- 100 
CIMs on 
30% 
1 Closed 
 
14 Fundless 
Sponsor  
 
Partner BA, MBA 10 11 Equity analysis 
and consulting 
$1-$7 M 3000 deals 
CIMs on 
10% 
4 Closed 
 
15 Fundless 
Sponsor  
 
Partner CPA, Master 
of 
Accountancy, 
MBA 
6 6 Public 
accounting and  
corporate M&A 
experience 
 
$5-$15 M 50-100 
reviewed 
CIMs on 
10% 
1 Closed 
16 Fundless 
Sponsor  
 
Principal BS Business 
Admin, 
MBA 
 
1. 2 Investment 
banking 
$2 - $20 
M 
200 
1 closed 
17 Bank PE 
Funded 
Group 
 
Director –
Business 
Development 
BA, MBA 8 8 Investment 
banking,  
venture capital 
and 
commercial 
banking 
 
$3 - $!0M  1000 deals 
2 Closed 
18 Business 
Development 
Company   
 
Chairman & 
Chief 
Executive 
Officer 
Founder 
 
CPA, JD 16 16 Extensive 
public 
accounting 
experience 
$4-$8 M 1000 deals 
10 + Closed 
 
19 SBIC 
 
Director – 
Co-Founder 
BSE Electric 
Engineering 
MBA 
10 10 10 years as 
president of 
business 
 
$1 - $3 M 400 
4 closed 
20 Sovereign 
Wealth Fund 
 
Senior Vice 
President 
BA, MBA 6 5 Investment 
banking 
$4- $12 
M 
500 
250 CIMs  
2-3 Closed 
    Median 
7.5 years 
Mean 10.2 
years 
Median 
10 Years 
Mean 
12.3 years 
 $1 -$20 
M 
Average of 
700 deals 
reviewed 
2.5 
closed 
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APPENDIX E: RESULTS OF TEASER REVIEWS 
 
 Teaser A B C D Order 
1 Institutional LP Fund 
 
Yes 
Owned similar 
business 
No 
Medicare 
reimbursement 
 
No 
Industry 
Yes 
Financial 
opportunity  
A-D 
2 Institutional LP Fund 
 
No 
Existing PEG 
ownership 
No 
Too small 
No 
Shareholders 
want to exit 
 
No 
Too small 
 
 
3  Institutional LP Fund 
  
 
No 
Location 
No 
Location 
No 
Industry 
No 
Financial 
 
4 Institutional LP Fund No 
Industry 
No 
Too small 
No 
Industry 
No 
Too small 
 
 
5 Institutional LP Fund 
 
No 
PEG ownership 
No 
Industry - 
healthcare 
No 
Financials – 
margins too thin 
 
Yes 
Financials 
D 
6 Institutional LP Fund No 
PEG ownership 
No 
Industry - 
healthcare 
No 
Industry 
Yes 
Financial 
opportunity 
 
D 
7 Institutional LP Fund Yes 
Financial 
opportunity 
No 
Industry- 
Healthcare 
 
No 
Industry 
Yes 
Industry 
A-D 
8  Institutional LP Fund No 
PEG ownership 
No 
Too small 
No 
Industry 
Yes 
Industry 
 
D 
9 
 
Institutional LP Fund No 
Financials- lost 
money 
Yes 
Industry-sees 
opportunity 
 
Yes 
Industry 
No 
Financials 
 
C-B 
10 Institutional LP Fund Yes 
Industry 
No 
Medicare 
reimbursement 
 
No 
Industry 
Yes 
Industry 
A-D 
11 Institutional LP Fund 
 
No 
Too small 
No 
Medicare 
reimbursement 
 
No 
Industry 
No 
Industry 
 
12 Institutional LP Fund 
 
Yes 
Financial 
No 
Medicare 
reimbursement 
 
Yes 
Financial 
No 
Too small 
A-C 
13 Fundless Sponsor  
 
No 
PEG ownership 
No 
Medicare 
reimbursement 
 
No 
Industry 
No 
Too small 
 
14 Fundless Sponsor  
 
No 
PEG ownership 
 
Yes 
Industry 
Yes 
Industry 
No 
Industry 
B-C 
15 Fundless Sponsor  
 
Yes 
Industry 
No 
Healthcare 
No 
Industry 
No 
Industry 
A 
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16 Fundless Sponsor  
 
No 
Offshore 
operation 
No 
Healthcare 
Yes 
Owners not 
involved in the 
business 
 
Yes 
Industry 
D-C 
17 Bank PE Funded Group No 
Offshore 
operations 
 
No 
Too small 
No 
Too small 
No 
Financial 
 
18 Business Development 
Company  
 
Yes 
Industry 
 
No 
Medicare 
reimbursement 
 
Yes 
Industry 
Yes 
Industry 
D-A-C 
19 SBIC 
 
No 
PEG ownership 
No 
Medicare 
reimbursement 
 
No 
Location 
Yes 
Industry 
D 
20 Sovereign Wealth Fund 
 
Yes 
Industry 
No 
Too small 
No 
Industry 
No 
Too small 
 
A 
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